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The purpose of this thesis is to examine the role of the
United States in the framework of ASEAN security in the post-
Cold War world. Toward that end, the thesis examines the
evolution of U.S. involvement in the political-economic-
military development of the states that came together as
ASEAN. It then seeks to identify the components of America's
security strategy for the region relevant to the post-Cold War
environment and, therefore, necessary in developing a New
World Order policy for the U.S. position in Southeast Asia.
Central arguments include: the U.S. military presence is
critical to the region's security; Japanese participation
through continued economic penetration with ASEAN is an
essential cornerstone of the regional security picture; the
potential for regional destabilization may be heightened as a
result of declining East-West confrontation; and, ASEAN 's
inability to act jointly in defense of regional security and
stability will necessitate an on-going U.S. military presence
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I . INTRODUCTION
For the duration of the Cold War, the United States was
the actor primarily responsible for creating and giving
substance to a world-wide system of formal and informal
security alliances whose explicit goal was containing and
deterring the spread of Soviet-sponsored communism. Indeed,
during the period of East-West confrontation, the Superpower
status of the United States was largely defined by its ability
to use its political, economic, and military resources to
sustain and direct the disparate elements of its security
network. "Containment" strategy appeared to be a global,
coordinated plan only because the United States, having a
world-wide span of interests, was the common denominator
wherever the strategy was employed. However, the means
through which containment was achieved varied depending upon
the particular circumstances of the region in which the
strategy was implemented. Significantly, on only two
occasions did the United States take up arms and engage in
protracted warfare in defense of its containment principles
—
both in Asia; one instance ending in success, the other in
failure.
The American involvement in Korea was a watershed for the
United States as it was the first test of U.S. resolve to
uphold its pledge to contain Soviet-sponsored communism. The
United States' experience in Vietnam was also a watershed for
U.S. strategists as it brought the country face to face with
the limitations of American military power and its resolve to
use it. However, containment strategy encompassed more than
achieving military preponderance over the Soviet adversary or
its client states. An equally critical component of the
strategy, and perhaps the most important gauge of its success,
was the fostering and nurturing of nascent, Western-oriented
polities and economies. Toward that end, the U.S. achieved
great success in Southeast Asia, paradoxically, the site of
its greatest military failure.
The United States, with the concomitant support of Japan
and others, has been a vitally important component of the
drive in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 1 (ASEAN)
to ensure regional stability and to build dynamic, export-
oriented economies. Through free trade/open market policies,
development assistance, and perhaps most significantly,
benevolent military hegemony, the United States has, and
!The Association was formed in August 1967. Its charter
members were Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and the
Philippines. Brunei became a member in 1984.
continues to play a major role in creating conditions
favorable to economic growth in ASEAN.
Today, however, the impetus to reevaluate our presence and
role in the region is generally two-fold and gathering
momentum. In the first place, the ending of the Cold War
removes or at least dramatically minimizes the perception of
threat imposed by the Soviet Union or its surrogates to the
region. Secondly, the growing U.S. trade imbalance with most
of the ASEAN states, as well as other Asia-Pacific nations,
has elicited more strident calls from the U.S. Congress to
adjust the level of our presence in the region vis a vis our
"allies," 2 i.e., more equitable burden sharing of the
responsibility for the area's security. Conversely, the
easing of U.S. -Soviet relations should open the eyes of those
calling for a dramatic change in the forward defense strategy,
based as it is on Cold War calculations, to a wider spectrum
of potentially volatile national and regional security issues
that have been subdued by the over arching U.S. -USSR global
competition. In this regard, the United States may find
itself in a Catch-22 as it gropes for a new policy in the
Asia-Pacific region. Is the U.S. military presence in
Southeast Asia, coupled with its national economic policy, an
indispensable instrument in effecting regional stability and
2Both formal alliance partners as well as those with whom we
have developed tacit security relationships.
economic growth? The deployment of U.S. forces in Southeast
Asia has certainly been a critical element in establishing the
framework within which the significant Japanese penetration
into ASEAN economies has occurred. Indeed, from the ASEAN
perspective, Japanese "access" in the region has been
predicated upon a strong U.S. military presence. If the
United States abandons the immediate region militarily and/or
enacts protectionist trade policies, will latent ethnic or
regional hostilities emerge, compounding the internal security
problems already facing most of the ASEAN governments, sending
their economies into a tailspin? Would a dramatic reordering
of the U.S. force structure in Southeast Asia create the
proverbial "power vacuum," thereby inviting potential
aspirants to regional hegemony, such as India, China, Japan,
or even Indonesia, to "test the waters?"
Clearly, any new U.S. initiatives regarding its post-Cold
War role in Southeast Asia must be calculated with regard to
their potential ramifications both in terms of their impact on
U.S. national interests, but also on the individual and
collective interests of the ASEAN states. Of course, it is
difficult, even in a static environment, to predict or
quantify the long-range outcome of any of the myriad policy
options available to U.S. policymakers seeking to further the
national interest. The dynamic nature of the post-Cold War
world would only seem to compound the problem confronted by
4
American strategists. However, the preeminent position of the
United States in the community of nations in the post-Cold
War/post-Gulf War world provides its policymakers with
unprecedented latitude in terms of potential options as they
seek to develop a strategy that will define America's role in
the New World Order (NWO)
.
An examination of America's global interests is beyond the
scope of this work. Therefore, this thesis will focus on the
political, economic, and military considerations that U.S.
strategists must address in defining America's New World Order
role in the framework of Southeast Asian, and specifically
ASEAN security. It will examine the evolution of the role
that the United States has played in promoting the security
and stability of the ASEAN states. It will look at key
motives which have influenced the development of our position
in the region, including the rise and fall of the Soviet
threat and the fiscal constraints which are now forcing us to
reevaluate the efficacy of longstanding defense and economic
policies. Several points will be underscored. First, the
United States' "security relationship" with the ASEAN states
has been derivative of its global containment strategy, yet
has now developed a strategic and economic significance
exclusive of Cold War considerations. Second, the military
and economic components of the relationship—including
Japanese participation—have been and will continue to be
5
indivisible. Third, many of the factors and assumptions which
underlaid the U.S. commitment to and defined its role in the
relationship have evolved and taken on new significance or
been overcome by events. The composite argument or theme
presented is that the strategic considerations which gave
shape to and defined the role of the U.S. in Southeast Asia
have changed due to post-Cold War realities; the effect of
these changes, however, may be more destabilizing in terms of
potential threat scenarios. The United States has then, deep
and abiding interests, military and economic, for remaining an
active participant in the framework of Southeast Asian
security. 3 Addressing these interests in Cold War terms may
result in wasteful and ultimately, exhaustive expenditures of
U.S. resources, and an exacerbation of its chronic economic
difficulties. Conversely, failure to address these interests
in the circumstances of the post-cold War may lead to the
destabilization of the region. The problem is, therefore, one
of management; the task being to integrate the ambitions and
concerns of the actors involved, yet still maintain a stable,
economically viable environment.
Opportunities, however, now exist for recalibrating the
basis upon which U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia had
^Militarily, U.S. access in the region proved indispensable
during the build-up of forces prior to the war against Iraq.
Economically, the U.S. was one of the top three trade partners in
both imports and exports of all the ASEAN states.
previously been formulated. What path lies ahead? What are
our interests in the region? What might be the ramifications
of a U.S. withdrawal from the area? Can the ASEAN states act
together to ensure regional stability and harmony? Should the
United States' agenda emphasize defense or economics? Can we
reconcile the seemingly contradictory desires to satisfy both
our interest in remaining economically competitive vis-a-vis
the ASEAN states (not to mention Japan) , and our goal of
providing an environment conducive to developing viable market
economies? Are these two goals mutually exclusive? This
thesis seeks to answer some of the more pressing questions.
II. THE UNITED STATES AND SECURITY AND STABILITY
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
The genesis of the U.S. commitment to security and
stability in Southeast Asia was the destruction of the Spanish
fleet at Manila Bay by Admiral George Dewey's East Asia
Squadron. The explicit rationale for such a bold strike
against the Asian stronghold of Spain's colonial empire was
retaliation for the heinous "attack" against the USS MAINE at
Havana harbor. However, for then Under Secretary of the Navy,
Theodore Roosevelt, the man who ordered the attack, the
implicit motive was to secure the valuable Philippine port at
Manila, strategically located as it was for access to the
important China market. As well, men like Roosevelt, his
strategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and others who believed in
America's Manifest Destiny shared a common vision of the
country's future; a future in which the "less developed"
civilizations in Asia and Latin America would benefit from the
spread of U.S. influence. In a sense, the idea of a Manifest
Destiny was almost a "burden" to those men who sought to
extend America's influence abroad. To them, the defeat of the
Spanish and the taking of the Philippines was akin to a
challenge to national self-righteousness. Certainly, few
nations have ever taken an easier step toward fulfilling their
8
destiny. "When Dewey arrived at Manila Bay, ... he discovered
seven armorless Spanish vessels. ... Dewey then destroyed the
Spanish flotilla, killing or wounding 400 men. No U.S. ship
was badly hit, and only several Americans received scratches.
After four hours of cannon fire, the United States had become
a power in the Western Pacific."4
It is perhaps one of the bitter ironies of America's
historical experience that its coming of age as a power in
Southeast Asia was remarkably easy and bore little cost, yet
its tenure as a power in the region has proved to be extremely
arduous and very costly. Indeed, the ease with which Admiral
Dewey dispatched the Spanish fleet proved to be no harbinger
of things to come even as the United States set out to pacify
the Filipino insurrection. Ultimately, the price paid by the
United States to establish its position in the Philippines
bought an even deeper commitment to the region in general, one
consequence of which has been war with the Japanese and North
Vietnamese, as well as the protracted Cold War with the Soviet
Union.
4Walter LaFeber, The American Age: United States Foreign
Policy at Home and Abroad Since 1750 (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, 1989), 193.
A. THE UNITED STATES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE ROOTS OF
COMMITMENT
1. The United States as Liberator
The argument has been put forth that if not for
commercial interests in Asia, the United States might very
well have avoided war against the Japanese in World War II. 5
Such reasoning implies America went to war against the
Japanese in order either to further its own economic position
or at least return to the status quo ante. Acceptance of the
"commercial interests" rationale as the underlying cause of
America's eventual participation in the conflict belies the
fact that economically, the United States was a bit player in
the region and, as per the Tydings-McDuf f ie Act of 1934 6 , was
in the process of shedding its sole colonial possession in the
area. What was most critical in bringing the United States to
war with Japan was Japan's reaction to the economic sanctions
we levied against it as a result of its militaristic drive to
establish the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. "[T]he
Japanese decision to go to war with the United States in 1941
was a direct result of America's total embargo on sales of oil
5June Teufel Dreyer, "Regional Security in Asia and the
Pacific," in Asian-Pacific Regional Security , ed. June Teufel
Dreyer (Washington, D.C.: Washington Press Institute, 1990), 3.
^his Act of Congress promised Philippine independence in ten
years.
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and other items to Japan." 7 Of course, it would be purely
speculative to attempt to divine whether or not war would have
been inevitable had the Japanese not attacked U.S. naval
forces at Pearl Harbor. What is beyond speculation though was
the level of determination, once the war started, of the
United States to drive the Japanese back to their homeland.
During the course of the war, the Allied powers did
considerable planning for the peace that would follow their
victory. However, unlike Northeast Asia or Europe, Southeast
Asia did not figure prominently in those post-war plans. 8
Before America's initial involvement in the actual fighting of
the war, the closest thing to a vision for the future, to
include Southeast Asia, was found in the Atlantic Charter: the
agreement on war aims between Churchill and Roosevelt which
essentially called for self-determination and equality for all
nations. 9 As the war raged on however, it became more
important to demonstrate allied solidarity even if it meant
giving tacit support to the preservation of colonial empires.
The most the United States could do unilaterally in support of
the spirit of the Charter was to follow through on its
7Dreyer, "Regional Security in Asia and the Pacific," 3.
8Russell H. Fifield, Americans in Southeast Asia: The Roots
of Commitment (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1973) , 36.
9LaFeber, The American Age . 380-1.
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pledge to grant the Philippines independence once the war was
won.
Perhaps as a result of the destruction suffered at
home by America's European allies, by 1943 Roosevelt saw in
Southeast Asia "the domino theory when it came to one country
winning independence from a European power." 10 He believed
the forces of nationalism at work in the region would prove
too strong to long stay repressed under the burden of severely
weakened colonial administrations. As the war in the Pacific
drew to a close, the necessity of formulating a posture
statement on the goals of the United States in the region
became more important, especially in light of the leadership
change caused by Roosevelt's untimely death. Towards that
end, a draft memorandum for President Truman prepared by the
State Department summarized Roosevelt's stance as follows:
President Roosevelt recognized the future
increasing importance to the United States of
Southeast Asia. He saw the necessity of aiding the
150,000,000 people there to achieve improved
social, economic and political standards. He
realized that dynamic forces leading toward self-
government are growing in Asia; that the United
States—as a great democracy—cannot and must not
try to retard this development but rather act in
harmony with it; and that social, economic and
political instability in the area may threaten the
10Fifield, Americans in Southeast Asia . 36.
12
peace and stability of the Far East and indeed the
world. 11
Obviously, America's experience in fighting the war in
the Pacific, the plodding island hopping campaign and
ultimately, the occupation of Japan, did much to enhance the
awareness of America's senior political and military officials
to the nationalism pervasive among many of the indigenous
elites. The problem of allied colonial possessions though,
persisted after Japan's defeat, contrary to Roosevelt's desire
to see America's example in the Philippines emulated by the
other extraregional powers. An early indication in the post-
Roosevelt era that the British, French, and Dutch had little
interest in abdicating their colonial positions occurred at
Potsdam where Churchill successfully increased the boundaries
of Lord Mountbatten • s Southeast Asia Command. 12 As a
consequence, the United States often sided against its former
allies as it pushed for decolonialization; a factor which
later contributed to the reservoir of goodwill enjoyed by the
United States with the ASEAN states. 13 However, because of
its initial aversion to becoming embroiled in Southeast Asia's
nFifield, Americans in Southeast Asia . 37, citing United
States-Vietnam Relations. 1945-1967 . Study Prepared by the
Department of Defense, Book 8, Government Printing Office,
Washington, 1971, pp. 13-14.
12Fifield, Americans in Southeast Asia . 50.
13Bilveer Singh, "The United States in Southeast Asia," Asian
Defence Journal . (April 1989): 53.
13
"Colonial Wars," 14 and its more pressing political concerns
with the occupation of Japan and the emerging civil war in
China, America's position in the region was somewhat
ambivalent and came to be de-emphasized in Washington. To be
sure, the U.S. did have some success as it pressured the Dutch
to resolve their war in Indonesia in terms favorable to the
independence movement, but on the whole, the U.S. policy
tended toward disengaged but concerned interest.
The granting of independence to the Philippines on 4
July 1946, cleared the way for the United States to distance
itself from the growing imbroglio in Southeast Asia and
concentrate its efforts in Northeast Asia where the problems
of civil war in China and occupation in Japan took center
stage. However, the United States did not completely divest
itself of responsibility to its former colonial possession.
To ensure that the fledgling independent Republic of the
Philippines was given every opportunity to develop under
autonomous rule, a number of legislative actions were taken by
the U.S. to accord the Philippines military and economic
assistance. "Military arrangements between the United States
and the Philippines were made in the agreement on bases signed
March 14, 1947, and that on military assistance concluded a
week later. These arrangements were not predicated on a U.S.
14The French in Indochina and the Dutch in Indonesia primarily,
14
military role in the rest of Southeast Asia." 15
Interestingly, just two days prior to the signing of the bases
agreement, President Truman delivered his famous speech to
Congress in which he outlined the tenets of the so-called
"Truman Doctrine." 16 Certainly, as the world moved closer to
bi-polarization, the significance that the Philippine bases
would have in U.S. policy during the Cold War could not have
been anticipated by even the most forward looking security
strategist.
2 . The Onset of the Cold War
Truman's Doctrine provided the ideological framework
upon which the Cold War was to be founded.
I believe that it must be the policy of the
United States to support free peoples who are
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities
or by outside pressure.
I believe that we must assist free peoples to
work out their destinies in their own way.
I believe that our help should be primarily
through economic and financial aid which is
essential to economic stability and orderly
political processes. 17
Ironically, the Doctrine, which was a response to events in
Europe, was more applicable, as a baseline from which U.S.
Cold War policy would be formulated, to the Asian theater
15Fifield, Americans in Southeast Asia . 74.
16LaFeber, The American Age . 453.
17The Management of Security Assistance . Study Prepared by the
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, Wright-
Patterson AFB, 1980, 1-18.
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where nationalism was rapidly coalescing into viable movements
than to Europe where the boundaries had, for all intents and
purposes, become part of the status quo. Although the motives
contained in the Doctrine may have been altruistic—especially
with regard to supporting "free peoples who are resisting
attempted subjugation"—they were quickly qualified in Cold
War terms—nationalism often became synonymous with communism;
a factor which served to color U.S. perceptions of the
struggle in Indochina. 18
The "loss" of China to the communists and the first
test of a Soviet atomic bomb in 1949 caused President Truman
to call for "a single, comprehensive statement of interests,
threats, and feasible responses ..." that could serve to guide
U.S. foreign policy. 19 The result was NSC-68. That document
postulated that the Cold War between the United States and the
Soviet Union was a zero-sum game where "any substantial
further extension of the area under the domination of the
Kremlin would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate
to confront the Kremlin with greater strength could be
assembled.... the assault on free institutions is worldwide
now, and in the context of the present polarization of power
18LaFeber, The American Aae . 494.
19John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1982), 90.
16
a defeat for free institutions anywhere is a defeat
everywhere. " 20
Prior to the articulation of the Truman Doctrine, the
events of 1949, and the drafting of NSC-68, the future role of
the United States in Asia, and the world for that matter, was
problematic; to what extent and where should the power and
resources available to the U.S. be used to shape the direction
of the post-war world? The Marshall Plan was one answer, but
it was directed at Europe. The invasion of South Korea by
Soviet-backed North Korean forces in June of 1950 validated
the premises of NSC-68 in the minds of many American
strategists and made the issue of expanding the U.S. role in
Asia, as well as elsewhere, not a question of should we, but
rather, how should we and how much. The resulting policy
manifested itself in a series of security pacts constructed by
Dean Acheson, as Truman's Secretary of State, and John Foster
Dulles, as Eisenhower's.
In Southeast Asia, the magnet which attracted the bulk
of U.S. concern was Vietnam. Having successfully, at least
for the near term, defeated the insurgent forces in the
Philippines, and with the British in control in Malaya, U.S.
Southeast Asian strategists devoted their attention to, if not
defeating, then at least containing the nationalist/communist
20Gaddis, Strategies . 91., citing NSC-68, April 14, 1950, FR:
1950, I, 238, 240.
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insurgency being led in Vietnam by Ho Chi Minn, "a Moscow-
trained Communist." 21 Vietnam, and therefore, Southeast Asia,
became critical in terms of their importance to the position
of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. The
reasoning, however, was rather convoluted:
Southeast Asia . . . had both the strategic
materials (such as oil and tin) and locations (for
air and naval bases) that the West required for its
cold-war build-up. The area seemed especially
important because, in American eyes, its markets
and raw materials were necessary for Japan's
stability. If Southeast Asia became Communist, a
top-secret National Security Council paper
concluded, it could mean * Japan's eventual
accommodation to Communism. • Eisenhower later
finished that thought: * Should Japan go communist
(in fact or in sympathy) the U.S. would be out of
the Pacific, and it [i.e., the Pacific] would
become a communist lake. ,22
To counter this "falling domino" principle, the United
States followed two parallel policy paths. First, massive
amounts of aid were poured into the French attempt to defeat
Ho's forces. Of course, after the French defeat at Dien Bien
Phu in 1954, the U.S. took more direct control of the effort
to defeat the communist insurgency including determining the
political leadership in South Vietnam, sending in military
advisors, and ultimately escalating its combat military
presence to over 500,000 troops as fighting intensified in the
21LaFeber, The American Age . 494.
22LaFeber, The American Acre . 520., citing "Legislative
Leadership Meeting, June 21, 1954, Supplementary Notes,"
Legislative Meetings Series, Box 4, Eisenhower Library.
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late 1960's. 23 Second, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO) was formed in 1954. As a barometer of Southeast Asian
unity against the communist threat though, "SEATO" was really
a misnomer as only two of the independent Southeast Asian
nations were signatories to the treaty: Thailand and the
Philippines. The other signatories, the United States, Great
Britain, France, Australia, and New Zealand, were all
extraregional actors with either active or post-colonial
interests in the region.
For the United States, the object of SEATO was:
to safeguard the independence of countries in the
region against the imminent danger of communist
invasion. The approach was overtly military,
undertaken at two levels: (1) to safeguard the
military security of Southeast Asian countries
against Communism by strengthening their military
power and capacity; and (2) to extend the mantle of
US military power over the region. The Americans
also understood the close relationship between
communist threat and the political, social and
economic problems and hence strove, behind the
protective US shield, to resolve these problems. 24
Thus, SEATO established the framework upon which U.S. policies
"were to shape Southeast Asia's political, economic and
military map for the next four decades" would be based. 25
Although U.S. policy in Vietnam may have become overly
influenced and defined in terms of the exigencies of the
^LaFeber, The American Age . 522-25, 561-565, 577-586.
^Singh, "The United States in Southeast Asia," 54.
25Singh, "The United States in Southeast Asia," 53.
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global Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union, there can be
little doubt that the commitment made to the region because of
that global perspective served to improve the "positions" of
what were to become the ASEAN states. As Bilveer Singh says
of that commitment: "...it permitted the countries there to
develop and strengthen themselves—in short, they gained
valuable breathing space; ASEAN countries also benefitted
economically from the war boom. At the same time, however, a
clear ideological line was drawn in Southeast Asia." 26
B. CHANGING STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: THE
RISE AND FALL OF THE SOVIET THREAT
1. The Emergence of ASEAN
In August 1967, near the height of the Vietnam War and
less than a year before the Tet Offensive, the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations was established. The primary
motivation for establishing ASEAN was generated ultimately
from two important considerations: 1) "the belief that local
disputes were wasteful and self-defeating" 27 ; and 2) the fear
that disunity among their number would increase the
probability of their being drawn into the potentially
destabilizing vortex created by Great Power rivalry in
26Singh, "The United States in Southeast Asia," 54.
^Sheldon W. Simon, "ASEAN Security in the 1990' s," Asian
Survey 39, no. 6 (June 1989): 580.
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Indochina. 28 As well, the Association sought to foster
economic cooperation among its members and to speak with a
common voice in the Association's economic and political
relations with outside actors. 29 It was felt that
" [P]olitical consultation to resolve local problems and to
present a unified front against external challenges would
enhance the ability of each state to ensure its own
integrity." 30 Equally critical to the charter memberstates
was a recognition and acceptance that the success or failure
of their attempt was dependent upon the beneficence of
extraregional actors
—
primarily the United States and Japan.
In terms of security then, there was a willingness
among the members, Indonesia excepted, to rely upon the
strength of friendly outside powers, particularly for external
defense. On the positive side, this stance has helped
maintain a semblance of unity among the members as none of
their number achieved a preponderance of power in the region.
Additionally, not unlike the situation in Japan, the
"forfeiture" of the responsibility for external defense to an
extraregional actor allowed for increased emphasis to be
28Sheldon W. Simon, "The United States and Conflict Resolution
in Southeast Asia," Contemporary Southeast Asia (September 1990):
87.
29Simon, "ASEAN Security in the 1990' s," 581.
30Simon, "ASEAN Security in the 1990' s," 580.
21
directed toward internal development. On the negative side,
"[T]he absence of a strong military component in ASEAN affairs
meant that all the Association could offer a threatened member
would be diplomatic solidarity." 31
As mentioned earlier, the U.S. interest in Southeast
Asia, outside of its obligation to the Philippines, grew out
of a Cold War perspective that viewed the region as an
integral part of the Japanese security equation. The
importance of Japan to the United States grew dramatically in
the aftermath of the invasion of South Korea when it became a
key component of its Asia-Pacific containment strategy. Since
Japan's security depended, in large part, on industrial
development which required access to Southeast Asian
resources, Southeast Asia, by implication, became an area of
increasing concern to U.S. strategists.
Of course, the U.S. became more intimately involved
with the region as American participation in the deepening
mire in Vietnam grew. Over time, American interests in the
region naturally expanded and came to be interpreted not just
in relation to its value and importance to the security of
Japan, but also in terms of its economic and strategic value
to the United States. Today, "American interests in ASEAN
stem from the population size of its memberstates, the
31Simon, "ASEAN Security in the 1990' s," 581.
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importance of raw materials, especially strategic and energy
resources, the region's importance for investments and market
outlets, the presence of strategic waterways, the ideological
orientation of the regimes and the treaty commitments with two
of the countries, namely Thailand and the Philippines." 32
2. The Nixon Doctrine: No More Vietnams
As a response to the growing difficulties in which
American forces found themselves in Vietnam, the Nixon
Doctrine was proclaimed in 1969. It called for "the transfer
of immediate self-defense responsibilities to indigenous
forces while the U.S. would provide material and economic
support assistance." 33 The resultant drawdown of forces saw
that "[B]y late 1972, he [Nixon] had pulled out all but 3,000
U.S. troops from Vietnam as well as one-third of the 60,000
American soldiers in South Korea, 12,000 from Japan, and
16,000 from Thailand." 34 In part, it was the evolution of the
U.S. perspective of its interests in Southeast Asia that
allowed its relations with the ASEAN states to endure the
radical change in the U.S. posture after the proclamation of
the Doctrine and the subsequent removal of forces. There
32Singh, "The United States in Southeast Asia," 55.
33The Management of Security Assistance . 1-32.
•^LaFeber, The American Age . 605.
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were, however, grave concerns among the ASEAN states about
what a reduced U.S. presence in the region would mean.
Japanese economic intrusion into Southeast Asia had
grown considerably by this time and a rapid U.S. withdrawal
from the region sparked fears of renewed Japanese hegemony.
These fears were manifested in the widespread rioting in
several of the ASEAN states during Japanese Prime Minister
Tanaka's tour of Southeast Asia in 1974. American strategists
thus confronted an emerging dilemma: Japanese economic
interaction in the ASEAN states was deemed crucial to their
internal stability and continued Western political
orientation, yet clearly, Japan's presence was unacceptable
without a U.S. "buffer." U.S. policymakers needed to
enunciate a strategy that would assuage the fears of the ASEAN
states that they were being abandoned by the U.S. security
umbrella. However, the motivation to define a new Pacific
Strategy was not entirely a response to the concerns of
American allies and trading partners in the region.
3. The Ford Doctrine: Still a Pacific Power
The American experience in Vietnam, culminating in the
failed last-ditch effort to save the Saigon regime in April of
1975, took a toll on the pride and confidence of the United
States. Deeply felt notions of U.S. infallibility were dealt
a severe blow; the confidence if not self-righteousness which
the United States carried into Manila Bay in 1898 began to
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erode seriously as people began to question America's goals
and intentions in the Asia-Pacific region. And yet, the
evolution of U.S. interests in the region, having grown to
encompass commercial as well as military and security
considerations, made "abandoning" the region untenable.
Thus, in December 1975, President Ford travelled to
Hawaii to issue a Pacific Doctrine, the gist of which was to
assert that "[D]espite the tragedies of Vietnam, ... the
United States remained a Pacific power." 35 To justify his
declaration, "Ford focused on the growing Commercial
involvement' in Asia," and acknowledged that "U.S. economic
interests in Asia were becoming larger than those in
Europe." 36 Yet he also acknowledged that with Asia's rise on
America's interest horizon was a concomitant overall decline
in U.S. power; a decline which would required its allies to
increase their contributions to the Asia-Pacific security
partnership. Of course, it was intended that Japan, whose
role will be discussed in Chapter III, would continue to be a
key element of that partnership. 37 During this period of
American "reevaluation" regarding its goals and interests in
the Asia-Pacific region, the results of a series of political-
35LaFeber, The American Age . 63 6.
^LaFeber, The American Age . 636.
37Singh, "The United States in Southeast Asia," 55.
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military initiatives undertaken by the U.S. and other various
actors in Southeast Asia were beginning to impact that
region's security picture.
4. Redefining U.S. Security Interests in Southeast Asia
The "opening" of China in 1972 by President Nixon was
the first among several moves made by some of the key actors
in the Asia-Pacific region over the next eight to ten years
which realigned the existing power relationships in the area,
alternatively decreasing and then increasing the threat
perception in ASEAN. The U.S. rapprochement with China was
viewed with some favor among ASEAN leaders as, somewhat akin
to the symmetry between the U.S. and Japan, it was felt that
given Washington's position in Southeast Asia, the prospects
for PRC intrusion would lessen. In fact, a concomitant
development in this period of rapprochement was a move to
resolve the "overseas Chinese" issue between China and ASEAN
as well as a reduction in China's support for indigenous
communist parties. 38 Also, "by the mid-197 0s, the
Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia had entered into formal
diplomatic relations with Beijing." 39 To be sure, problems
persisted and the fears among Southeast Asians of latent
38Takashi Tajima, China and South-east Asia: Strategic
Interests and Policy Prospects . Adelphi Paper #172, (London: The
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983): 16-28.
39A. James Gregor, In the Shadow of Giants (Stanford: Hoover
Institution Press, 1989) , 71.
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Chinese hegemonistic goals in the region remain real today.
Several factors account for the change in Chinese policy
toward the region. A hostile Vietnam, the ever-dangerous
Soviet Union, and her own obviously weakened state following
the ravages of the Cultural Revolution may help to explain the
willingness of China to encourage the rapprochement with the
U.S., as well as the desire to limit the scope of her external
obligations and causes. Unwittingly then, the changing power
relationships in Indochina and East Asia had the effect of
moderating ASEAN 's threat perceptions.
In 1978, however, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia
began a new series of moves by the Asia-Pacific "powers" which
served to heighten the threat potential to ASEAN emanating
from the mainland. The events which followed over the next
two years—China's brief incursion into Vietnam in February
1979, the subseguent stationing of a growing number of Soviet
naval and air forces at Cam Ranh Bay and Danang, and finally,
the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979
—
refocused U.S. attention on the vulnerability of the ASEAN
states and the Southeast Asian region in general. As Sheldon
Simon notes, "By the early 1980s, then, stability in Southeast
Asia was once again seen as an important condition in
Washington, not because of an ideological battle against world
communism as in the 1960s but because of growing Soviet
capabilities to disrupt international commerce and energy
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supplies which transit through the region." 40 The effects
were almost instantaneous. U.S. base negotiations with the
Philippines were rapidly concluded, after nearly two years of
wrangling, and at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers 1 Meeting in Bali
in July 1979, Secretary of State Vance reaffirmed the
commitment of the United States to the region's security. 41
Again though, U.S. strategists faced a dilemma with regard to
the formulation of a "deterrent" strategy in the region—could
the United States attain a credible deterrent posture without
itself becoming the bulk of the deterrent?
Several options for the coming decade were available
to the United States in responding to the challenge to its
Asian interests—including the security and economic viability
of ASEAN. First, "[T]he idea of a Sino-American alliance was
in fashion during the Carter years and in the early years of
the Reagan administration." 42 However, there were numerous
arguments against such an alliance and " [E] ventually, China's
own cool reception to the idea of a strategic alliance, and
its moves toward reconciliation with the Soviet Union in 1982,
^Sheldon W. Simon, "Explaining American Security Interests in
Southeast Asia," in International Security in the Southeast Asia
and Southwest Pacific Region . ed. T.B. Millar, (St Lucia:
University of Queensland, 1983), 19.
41Simon, "Explaining American Security Interests," 29.
42Dreyer, Asian-Pacific Regional Security . 5.
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spelled the demise of this concept."43 Second, "[A] Sino-
Japanese alliance struck some American policy makers as
desirable since it meant the Asianization of the defense of
Asia and the Pacific." 44 This proposal contained notable
deficiencies, particularly its assumption of complimentary
economies, goals, interests, and threat perceptions between
the two nations. Perhaps even more problematic would have
been selling this idea to ASEAN. The third option explored
involved forging an alliance between the non-communist states
in the region. 45 Several factors served to undermine this
possibility as well, including, the lack of consensus among
the non-communist states as to the major threat, the
possibility that an anti-communist alliance would serve to
drive the communist states closer together, and the
unfavorable impact such an alliance would necessarily have on
the emerging U.S. -China relationship. 46 Ultimately, the
United States fell back on its traditional reliance on the
bilateral and multilateral defense agreements it had with
43Dreyer, Asian-Pacific Regional Security . 5-6.
^Dreyer, Asian-Pacific Regional Security . 6.
45Dreyer, Asian-Pacific Regional Security . 7.
^Dreyer, Asian-Pacific Regional Security . 7-8.
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various nations in the region47 and sought to use these
relationships and its own position as the common link between
them to maintain a balance of power in the region.
In Southeast Asia, the manifestation of this balance
was, on the one hand, a United States-ASEAN-Japan-China
"partnership"; and, on the other hand, a Soviet-Vietnamese
alliance. 48 As a result of the varying political, military,
and economic capabilities of the "partnership," including
self-imposed limitations, roles were defined early on. That
the United States assumed more of the military burden was
logical because in Washington's eyes, the events in Southeast
Asia were an extension of the global rivalry with the Soviet
Union—a rivalry that had been stirred from relative dormancy
in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan. For ASEAN, whose
focus was directed more to the regional concern of the
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, their position as militarily
weak developing economies necessitated they take a more
political and diplomatic role in resolving the crisis in
47These relationships included formal pacts with Japan, Korea,
Thailand, the Philippines, and, Australia and New Zealand.
Additionally, the "China Card" was considered a valuable asset in
establishing the framework of an anti-Soviet-Vietnam coalition.
China continued to be an effective "deterrent" against the threat
of a full-scale Vietnamese incursion into Thailand throughout the
1980's.
48K.S. Nathan, "U.S. -Soviet Relations in Asia: Their Impact
upon ASEAN and Japan," in Trilateralism in Asia: Problems and
Prospects in U. S. -Japan-ASEAN Relations , eds. K.S. Nathan and M.
Pathmanathan, (Kuala Lumpur: Antara Book Company, 1986) , 56.
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Indochina. The role Japan would come to play in this
partnership was "defined" in the Carter-Ohira Joint
Declaration of 1979. It called for Japan to "increase its
contribution to the security of the region by playing the
A non-military role of cooperating with Asian-Pacific nations
in economic development and educational, scientific, and
technological exchange." 49 This sentiment was consistently
reinforced by ASEAN leadership throughout the 1980' s. 50
China's participation in the "partnership," while not
universally appreciated, was nonetheless accepted because of
her Kautilian relationship with Thailand, ASEAN' s "front-line"
state after Vietnam invaded Cambodia.
For the United States, the geographic scope of the
Soviet threat to its interests in Southeast Asia was expanded
dramatically in the years following Vietnam's invasion of
Cambodia. The physical presence of growing Soviet forces at
Cam Ranh Bay and Danang, the burgeoning strength of the Soviet
Pacific fleet, and the invasion of Afghanistan all served to
illustrate to U.S. strategists that the Soviet ability to
blockade or interdict vital shipping routes in and around
Southeast Asia was a real and present danger. As Gregor
49Hiroko Yamane, "Japan as an Asian/Pacific Power," Asian
Survey 27, no. 12 (December 1987): 1307.
50Michael Richardson, "No Role for Japanese Military," Asia-
Pacific Defence Reporter 17, no. 1 (July 1990): 11.
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explained, "any nation in the West Pacific that depends on sea
traffic to sustain its economies and defense forces would have
to be gravely concerned by evidence that the Soviet Union
could interdict critical sea-lanes in terms [times] of crisis
or conflict." 51 The United States viewed the intrusion of
Soviet forces into the South China Sea, coupled with advances
in Southwest and Northeast Asia, as indicative of a global
realignment of the correlation of forces, in part due to the
military malaise in the U.S., characterized by low morale,
high drug use, and a significantly denuded force structure,
that followed the end of the Vietnam war—the manifestation
of which was, for naval forces, the adoption of the "Swing"
strategy. 52
5. Active "Defense": The Maritime Strategy
The Maritime Strategy was the U.S. Navy's response to
the increasingly untenable shift in the correlation of forces.
Codified by President Reagan in December 1982, the essential
requirement of the Maritime Strategy was to attain "Maritime
51Gregor, In the Shadow of Giants . 50.
52The "Swing" strategy called for shifting Pacific fleet units
to the Atlantic fleet in the event of a conflict in Europe to
effect the reinforcement/resupply of NATO forces. The adoption of
this strategy was forced by the dramatic reduction of naval forces
which occurred after the Vietnam war. The "Swing" strategy was an
admission that the U.S. could no longer fight a "two-ocean" war.
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Superiority" over our Soviet nemesis. 53 The result was a
renunciation of the "Swing" strategy and a massive build-up of
the U.S. Navy with heavy emphasis placed on aircraft carriers
and sea control forces. 54 The expansion of military
capability was not limited to U.S. forces. In Japan, Prime
Minister Nakasone shared President Reagan's concern regarding
the menacing presence of Soviet forces operating in the Sea of
Japan as well as the Sea of Okhotsk and correspondingly sought
to increase the capability of the Japanese Self-Defense
Forces, particularly in anti-submarine warfare. Defense
budgets in the ASEAN states expanded as well, with an
increasingly sophisticated inventory of weapons being procured
from the United States and other Western powers. That the
U.S. Maritime Strategy had a "spill over" effect on the
militaries of its Asian allies and trade partners was
intentional. The Strategy required U.S. forces to operate far
forward and "take the fight to the enemy." America's allies
were expected to be partners in this strategy; their roles
being to provide base facilities for U.S. air and naval
forces, and "direct cooperation through the utilization of
their own air and naval assets to monitor regions adjacent to
their territories and, if need be, escort and fight alongside
53G. Jacobs, "US Seapower in the Western Pacific," Asian
Defence Journal (March 1990): 54.
^Jacobs, "US Seapower in the Western Pacific," 54.
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U.S. forces." 55 In practice, however, the Strategy was
essentially unilateralist. Increasingly it became a point of
great contention between the United States and its allies as
the 1980's wore on especially in light of both Gorbachev's new
initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region and Washington's more
urgent calls for "equitable" burden sharing in view of
America's growing trade imbalance with the region.
6. ASEAN and The Maritime Strategy
There are several reasons why the U.S. Maritime
Strategy failed to engender a more enthusiastic "direct
support" response from ASEAN. Most importantly,
open collaboration would violate ASEAN 's primary
foreign policy goal: the creation of ZOPFAN. The
zone concept serves several political purposes:
(1) it sustains ASEAN 's credibility within the
Nonaligned Movement despite the fact that most of
its members have ties to Western powers; (2) it
posits a long-term goal for Southeast Asia free of
all great power encroachments, including those by
the United States, Soviet Union, and, potentially
China; (3) it provides a politically acceptable way
of satisfying Indonesia's desire to be the security
policy leader of ASEAN without requiring other
Western-aligned members to sacrifice their security
links to outsiders. 56
A second reason is that
ASEAN states . . . are less concerned about the
Soviet presence in Southeast Asia than is the
"Sheldon W. Simon, "Pacific Rim Reactions to U.S. Military
Strategy," in Security. Strategy, and Policy Responses in the
Pacific Rim , eds. Young Whan Kihl and Lawrence E. Grinter,
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989) , 81.
^Simon, "Pacific Rim Reactions," 92.
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United States. They foresee no direct threat to
themselves from the USSR. Rather, the Soviet
presence is seen as: (1) part of the global
superpower confrontation; (2) the exertion of its
role as an Asian power; (3) necessary both to
support and exert leverage on Vietnam; (4) an
effort to surround China; and (5) the deployment of
sufficient capability to protect its own SLOCs to
and from Vladivostok. 57
Lastly, if war erupted with the Soviet Union, ASEAN believed
that U.S. naval forces, particularly carrier battle groups,
would have to devote a significant portion of their assets to
self-defense, "with little to spare to support friendly armies
on land." 58 The fact that the primary security concern of
ASEAN during this period was the threat of Vietnamese
adventurism, particularly into Thailand, served to underscore
the differences in threat perceptions between the U.S. and its
Southeast Asian "partners." These differences help to explain
why the concept of burden sharing, given this basic asymmetry,
has been difficult for the U.S. to sell in the region.
The decline of the Soviet "threat" in Southeast Asia
in recent years has laid the concept of a forward-oriented
maritime strategy for the region's defense open to question in
U.S. policy circles: the implication is that U.S. security
interests in the region have been largely derivative of its
57Simon, "Pacific Rim Reactions," 93.
58Richard K. Betts, "The United States: Global Deterrence," in
Security Interdependence in the Asia Pacific Region , ed. James W.
Morley, (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1986), 45.
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greater, global concerns over Soviet intentions. 59 Yet, the
United States has significant economic and political interests
in Southeast Asia which merit inclusion into a post-Cold War
security framework. In testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, Richard Solomon, stated that
"ASEAN 1 s vitality has now made it one of the pillars of U.S.
relations with the Pacific; and we view the association as an
essential ingredient in any entity of regional economic
cooperation." 60 As well, there is considerable popular
sentiment in ASEAN which favors the continuation of a U.S.
presence in the region. 61 However, economic considerations,
both in terms of the current account imbalance and pressures
for budget reductions, will necessarily limit the options
available to the United States as it attempts to articulate a
new strategy for the pursuit and protection of its interests
in Southeast Asia. While future United States policy must
serve the national interest, it must also be mindful of the
repercussions it will have in the region. American attention
59Betts, "The United States: Global Deterrence," 46.
department of State, "The Promise of Pacific Economic
Cooperation," by Richard Solomon. Statement before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, 21 September 1989. Department of State
Bulletin (December 1989) . 35.
61Michael Richardson, "Plans for a post-Cold War peace," Asia-
Pacific Defence Reporter 17, no. 5 (November 1990): 32.
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is particularly warranted since the U.S. has actively
encouraged Japan's participation in the structure of the
region's security framework.
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III. DEALING WITH JAPAN: THE PRICE PAID
FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The promise of multipolarity in the post-Cold War world
may be viewed as welcome news not only to the United States
and the Soviet Union, but also to the nations whose political,
economic, and military achievements have been to some degree
or another stifled by the overriding exigencies of the
Superpower confrontation. New horizons for national self-
expression have been opened. No longer are the "client"
states of the Superpowers constrained by zero-sum political
considerations based on the East-West struggle.
In the Western camp, South Korea, Japan, and the NATO
allies can all be expected to pursue far more "independent"
foreign policy initiatives. India may become more emboldened
as she seeks to legitimize her claim to predominance over the
Indian Ocean littoral. China is also likely to seek a greater
role in both international fora as well as the Asia-Pacific
region. While these changes are enthusiastically received in
some quarters, in ASEAN they create apprehension and concern
about the potential for newly ambitious regional hegemons,
particularly those that might follow in the wake of any
precipitous drawdown of U.S. forces. In this regard, ASEAN
harbors special fears over Japanese intentions.
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These fears appear to be grounded in two primary
considerations: 1) Japan's extensive economic penetration into
ASEAN economies gives it considerable leverage in the region;
and 2) The U.S. influence on Japanese security policy will
inevitably weaken in the post-Cold War realignment of
international power. As Michael Vatikiotis explains, "If, . .
.
Japan is likely to move steadily away from its preoccupation
with the US-Soviet relationship, Asean's strategic concerns on
Japan's future role focus on where Tokyo's security policy
will be re-directed." 62 Indeed, in a speech made during a
recent tour of ASEAN, Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu's
announcement "that Japan will assume a greater political role
in Asia has underlined Tokyo's emerging power status." 63 For
its part, ASEAN may be willing to accept a greater role for
Japan, but only if it remains strongly allied with the United
States. According to Singapore's Prime Minister Goh Chok
Tong, "A Japan that remains firmly anchored to the US alliance
system and which is trusted by its neighbours will be a
positive force . . .
"
64 A closer examination of the Japan-ASEAN
relationship in the U.S. -Japan-ASEAN security framework may
62Michael Vatikiotis, "Yankee please stay," Far Eastern
Economic Review . 13 December 1990, 30.
63Michael Vatikiotis, "The gentle giant," Far Eastern Economic
Review . 16 May 1991, 11.
"Vatikiotis, "The gentle giant," 12.
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help to explain why, from the ASEAN perspective, the
acceptance of the Japanese component must be predicated on a
viable U.S. presence in the region.
Any discussion of ASEAN' s modern relationship with Japan
must, of necessity, have the pre-World War II period of
liberation/occupation as a reference point from which to
examine post-war policies. In the pre-war years, the Japanese
were seen as liberators by many of the nations in Southeast
Asia whose history had been marked by European colonialism.
Japan spread through the region gaining popular support for
its goal of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere with
ethnocentric, anti-colonial slogans like "Asia for Asians."
Japanese influence permeated the region rapidly under the
guise of liberator but the enthusiasm for their message
rapidly vanished as the brutality of military occupation came
to be felt with increasing severity. While true liberation
and independence did not necessarily follow the defeat of
Japan in the Pacific War, they would soon be forthcoming.
The burden of the unpleasant memories and suspicions of
Japan's intentions caused by that period of militaristic
economic hegemonism has been carried like unwanted baggage by
Japanese leaders since Prime Minister Yoshida. Japan's past
has had a significant influence on ASEAN fears regarding the
implications for Southeast Asia of Japan's current pervasive
influence on national economies. Indeed, today those fears
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have been heightened in some circles largely because the post-
war Japanese economic "intrusion" into ASEAN has been
predicated on a perceived symmetry between the United States
and Japan. In other words, Japan's penetration into the ASEAN
economy has been more acceptable as long as it was accompanied
by a strong U.S. military presence in the region to act as a
counterbalance
—
precluding the possibility of a military role
by Japan. It is felt that the impending decline of the U.S.
military presence may open the door for deeper Japanese
involvement in the region; an untenable situation from the
ASEAN point of view. 65 How has this tripartite relationship
developed?
In the post-World War II history of Japan's relations with
Southeast Asia, there have been three distinct phases:
The first phase could be called the period of
reparations (1952-1964) , characterized by the
pursuit of economic diplomacy through the payment
of reparations. The second phase, the period of
regional development (1965-1975) , was brought about
largely by changing American policy toward
Southeast Asia and was characterized by Japan's
active participation in regional economic
development—e.g. , the establishment of the Asian
Development Bank, The Ministerial Conference for
the Economic Development of Southeast Asia, and the
Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) . In a sense,
during the first two periods, the most important
variable in explaining Japan's policy toward
Southeast Asia was the American presence in the
region, on which hinged Prime Minister Yoshida's
Asian Marshall Plan, Prime Minister Kishi's
Southeast Asian Development Fund, and Prime
65Richardson, "No Role for the Japanese Military," 11.
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Minister Sato's strong endorsement of regional
development. The third phase, the so-called Fukuda
Doctrine period, began with the declaration by
Prime Minister Fukuda in August 1977 of Japan's
positive politico-economic role in Southeast
Asia. 66
Of course, altruism was not the primary motivation in
developing Japan's Southeast Asia policies. The number one
concern of post-war Japan was to rebuild her economic capacity
which relied on imported raw materials and export markets for
finished products. Toward that end, the post-war environment
in the Asia-Pacific region, defined as it was by the U.S.
preoccupation with "containing" communism, allowed the
Japanese to do peacefully what they could not do militarily
—
establish a regional economic infrastructure suited to their
own development needs. Indeed, during the period of
reparations, the manner in which reparations were made served
to enhance Japan's position in Southeast Asian markets which
has served her long-term economic growth requirements. 67
Actually, there existed, and to some extent still does exist,
a feeling that the economic relationship between Japan and
Southeast Asia was, and is, mutually beneficial. The newly
emerging independent economies of Southeast Asia were in need
of development funds and Japan had funds which she wanted to
"Sueo Sudo, "Japan-ASEAN Relations: New Dimensions in
Japanese Foreign Policy," Asian Survey 28, no. 5 (May 1988): 509.
67Bilveer Singh, "Japan and Southeast Asia," Asian Defence
Journal (June 1989): 69.
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use for resource exploitation and market development. Japan's
relation with Southeast Asia was best seen as a symbiotic
relationship. During the second phase, Japan's influence
became more pervasive and the reaction in Southeast Asia
became more alarmist; however, the U.S. presence in the region
served to moderate fears of renewed Japanese hegemonism.
Among the region's ruling elites, the perception of a symmetry
in the U.S. -Japan relationship in Southeast Asia had
developed.
The formation of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations gave the region a sense of unity which Japan applauded
"as an affirmation of growing Southeast Asian regionalism,
thus giving tacit encouragement to Tokyo's regional
development strategy." 68 However, Japan's on-going and rapid
economic penetration of the area elicited a series of
"collective" actions from ASEAN including "Thailand's Japanese
goods boycott movement in 1972 and Malaysia's criticism of
Japanese production and export of synthetic rubber." 69
Coincident with this was the winding down of the U.S.
involvement in the Vietnam conflict and, as per the Nixon
Doctrine, the transfer of "self-defense" responsibilities to
indigenous forces. As a result of the new role the U.S. was
^Sudo, "Japan-ASEAN Relations," 510.
69Sudo, "Japan-ASEAN Relations," 511.
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ostensibly seeking for itself in the framework of Southeast
Asian regional security, the Japanese position began to look
increasingly strong. The perception of a developing asymmetry
in the U.S. -Japan relationship in Southeast Asia once again
caused ASEAN leaders to cast suspicion on Japanese goals and
intentions in the region. The deterioration of Japan's
relations with ASEAN reached a head with Prime Minister
Tanaka ' s visit in 1974 which saw widespread anti-Japanese
demonstrations throughout the region. 70
Clearly, the impending military decline of the U.S.
presence in the region, which had been so beneficial to Japan
in allaying the fears of her trade partners that she might
again one day seek to "dominate" the region, coupled with
Japan's increasing reliance on the markets and resources of
ASEAN, served to compel Japanese leadership to formulate a new
approach to regional interaction. The underlying themes of
the new approach were to be "openness" and "forthrightness";
the goal being to achieve a mutual understanding of each
party ' s needs and concerns
.
The Fukuda Doctrine, which has been the foundation of
Japan's present relationship with ASEAN, enunciated three
primary principles:
1. Japan rejects the role of a military power and
seeks the peace and prosperity of Southeast Asia.
70Sudo, "Japan-ASEAN Relations," 511.
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2. Japan wants a relationship of mutual confidence
and trust based on heart to heart understanding.
3
.
Japan is an equal partner of ASEAN countries
and will cooperate positively in their own efforts,
while aiming at a relationship of mutual
understanding with Indochina. 71
The first act of good faith in the third phase of relations
was a one billion dollar pledge of aid for ASEAN industrial
development; a prime example of Tokyo's "dollar diplomacy."
Further Japanese economic influence in Southeast Asia was
gained under the Carter-Ohira Joint Declaration of 1979. This
declaration called for Japan to "increase its contribution to
the security of the region by playing the * non-military ' role
of cooperating with Asian-Pacific nations in economic
development and educational, scientific, and technological
exchange. This economic-based approach to the well-being of
the Asian-Pacific region, termed Comprehensive security, ' was
what allowed Japan to make its presence increasingly accepted
in the region without becoming involved in military or
political issues." 72 It seems then, that as with the first
two periods of Japanese-Southeast Asian relations, the third
phase also saw the Japanese make significant, decisive,
economic inroads into the region primarily because the United
States was willing to shoulder the burden of military defense
71Singh, "Japan and Southeast Asia," 70.
72Yamane, "Japan as an Asia/Pacific Power," 1306.
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in the area. Of course, the extent and depth of economic
penetration would only be heightened during the 1980' s, as
Japan began to have a tremendous trade surplus with the United
States which allowed for even greater direct investment and
Official Development Assistance (ODA) disbursements throughout
the region.
Today, the geo-political landscape is changing as a result
of the dramatic events of the last two years. The political-
economic-military status quo which governed the trilateral
relationship between ASEAN, the United States, and Japan is
"under strain" due to the weight of demands for change
—
particularly from the U.S.—caused by reduced superpower
tensions and domestic economic problems. What will be the
effect of these changes in ASEAN? How will issues of security
and stability be addressed? How will the threat horizons of
the ASEAN states change as new roles are thrust upon the
militaries of the memberstates?
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IV. "THREATS" TO ASEAN SECURITY
A discussion of the nature of the threat to ASEAN in the
wake of the events of the last two years is necessarily a
subjective analysis of those issues which have already become
of concern to the Association's leadership. This is simply
because the results of the global "shake-up" have not yet been
fully realized
—
particularly with respect to how they will
affect U.S. policy in the region. Indeed, the moves made by
the United States in response to its own economic problems and
the changing superpower relationship will have the most impact
on the future security of the ASEAN states. Uncertainty may
well be the most immediate concern to ASEAN leaders;
principally because the post-Cold War role that the U.S. seeks
for itself in the region will have a significant impact on the
calculations being made by other nations who may seek an
expanded regional role. 73 However, a deeper examination of
the variety and complexity of the threat scenarios facing the
ASEAN states is warranted in order to fully understand the
significance of the U.S. role in the framework of Southeast
Asian security.
73China, India, Japan, and Indonesia are all potential seekers
of regional hegemony.
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A. INSURGENT GROUPS/RELIGIOUS SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS
Although insurgent groups are active in all of the ASEAN
states except Singapore, the only group that currently
presents a real threat to the government is the New People's
Army (NPA) in the Philippines. 74 The threat presented by the
NPA is especially grave since the "Armed Forces of the
Philippine [s] (AFP) is neither united nor firmly under
civilian control." 75 Clearly, the prospect of a pullout of
U.S. forces from Subic Naval Station and Clark Air Force Base
compounds the problems of internal stability for the Aquino
government. Yet, she is in a Catch-22 because in order to
satisfy the demands of her rivals, she must press for a U.S.
withdrawal or a Treaty agreement on future U.S. use of the
bases, the demands of which, from all reports, would be
untenable to the U.S. government.
Religious and national separatist movements are active in
Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The withdrawal of
U.S. forces from the region could invite extraregional
supporters of these groups to step-up aid efforts which might
require the ASEAN governments to devote increasing resources
to national defense forces which might, in turn, hamper
74Mark Turner, "The Philippines: disillusioned and disunited,"
Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter 17, no. 1 (July 1990): 11-12.
75Turner, "The Philippines," 11.
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economic growth. 76 Indeed, as we will see in Chapter Five,
the ASEAN states are devoting an increasing percentage of
their GDP towards the acquisition of sophisticated Western
military hardware in order to extend their own defense
perimeters in the hopes of deterring foreign adventurism into
their internal affairs. The effects of this general force
modernization have not been without impact within the
Association—a testimony to the problems of "unilateralism
existing in a multilateral framework." 77 In fact, a regional
arms race of sorts has developed which has exacerbated
existing intraregional tensions among the members. 78
B. INTRA-ASEAN CONCERNS
ASEAN is not a homogeneous organization. Southeast Asia
is a region which has been riven by territorial disputes such
as those involving the Spratly Islands, and by border
skirmishes, such as those which have occurred between
Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, and between the Philippines
and Malaysia, as well as many others. Indeed, as Wong Kan
Seng, Singapore's Foreign Minister has pointed out, "[T]he
prime reason for conflict in Southeast Asia was never
76See note 16.
^Zara Dian, "The Return to ASEAN Solidarity," Asian Defence
Journal (August 1989): 3.
78FBIS-EAS-90-033, "Article Analyzes Military's Political
Role," 16 February 1990, 80.
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superpower intervention but local rivalries that had their
root causes in historical animosities, racial and religious
divisions or competition for influence and resources." 79 This
may partly help to explain why military cooperation within
ASEAN has never gone beyond bilateral relations—accounting
for the willingness of the ASEAN states to allow the U.S. to
provide "blanket" security for the region. 80 With the
impending decline of the U.S. military presence in the region,
a factor which has arguably had some moderating effect on
intraregional tensions, the inclination to "paper over"
disputes may wane as group interests are overcome by national
self-interest. Will a void be created by a U.S. withdrawal,
to be filled by a regional or possibly an extraregional
hegemon?
C. EXTRA-ASSOCIATION CONCERNS
Of course, the most publicized threat to ASEAN security
has been that emanating from the Indochinese states,
specifically Vietnam. The 11 year occupation of Cambodia by
Vietnamese forces was a test of ASEAN unity in the face of a
commonly feared enemy; a test which they passed quite
admirably. However, the events of the last two years,
79Michael Richardson, "Breaking down the Asian barriers,"
Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter 17, no. 3 (September 1990): 24.
80Zakaria Haji Ahmad, "Future Patterns of ASEAN Regional
Security Cooperation," Asian Defence Journal (July 1989): 28.
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Gorbachev cutting aid to Vietnam, and the withdrawal of
Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, have served to dramatically
reduce the threat potential from Indochina. 81 How will these
events affect the future of ASEAN unity on security issues?
Zakaria Ahmad claims that politically, "the main raison d'etre
of that unison (fear of Vietnamese aggression) may no longer
be perceived as a tenable argument in the light of recent
international and regional developments in which the prospects
for conflict and conflagration are dim." 82 As well, China has
long figured prominently in the threat calculations of the
ASEAN states. Beijing's policies toward ASEAN have generally
been formulated with her own security interests in mind; e.g.,
during the crisis in Indochina she found it useful to "ally"
herself with Thailand and foster good political relations with
the other memberstates as a hedge against Vietnamese
expansion. 83 In the future, "[T]he role that communist China
can and will play in the region will be significantly
influenced by international considerations, the changing
military balance, and current and anticipated economic
interests and concerns, as well as the internal political,
81FBIS-EAS-90-055, "Perception of Threat from North said
Outdated'," 21 March 1990, 30.
82Zakaria Haji Ahmad, "The Impending Challenge to ASEAN
Regional Cooperation," Asian Defence Journal (December 1989): 5.
83Gregor, In the Shadow of Giants . 70-75.
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social, and economic circumstances in Southeast Asia." 84
Ultimately, the prospects for extraregional military or
"ideological" intrusion into the region will hinge on whether
or not the U.S. retains a permanent presence in Southeast
Asia. 85
However, it is most likely that the "threat" to ASEAN will
be more strongly felt in the economic-environmental realm, and
will be centered on the Japan-ASEAN relationship. The depth
of penetration of Japan into the economies of Southeast Asia
has been insidious, and raises some serious concerns regarding
the future of economic sovereignty in the region. Some of the
concerns voiced over their methods of economic interaction
indicate that: the region has become too dependent upon
Japanese financial assistance; Japanese industry-led
development is too self-centered and lacks a sense of regional
responsibility; and, a vertical hierarchy is being established
in which economic relations are becoming increasingly
dominated by and beneficial for Japan. Bruce Koppel and
Michael Plummer list several reasons why these concerns are
likely to continue and perhaps become more divisive. First,
"Japan is the largest bilateral aid donor in every Asian
country except Vietnam, Kampuchea, Laos, Malaysia, and
MGregor, In the Shadow of Giants . 75.
85Richardson, "No Role for Japanese Military," 11.
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Pakistan." Second, "there is now a pattern of large and still
growing annual ODA commitments from Japan. ... in most cases
the largest portion of the commitments will have two
characteristics: (1) the aid flows are loans channeled
through the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) , and (2)
to one degree or another the loans are tied; they must be used
to purchase goods and services of Japanese origin." 86 Here
again, U. S. -Japanese cooperation in the region is a critical
precondition for continued stability. "Without it, the
Pacific might be split into two opposing economic blocks,"
according to then Singaporean Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew,
" X A de facto emergence of such blocks will mean a world
fraught with conflicts....'" 87 To be sure, there are those in
ASEAN who have a more favorable opinion of the relationship,
or perhaps see it as a necessary evil that they must accept in
order to pave the way for their own economic growth. The best
illustration of Japan's precarious balance between economic
hegemonist and indispensable benefactor is in the case of
Japanese-Thai relations. While there are some truly unique
aspects of this relationship, nevertheless the process and
methods of economic intrusion by the Japanese into Thailand
86Bruce Koppel and Michael Plummer, "Japan's Ascendancy as a
Foreign-Aid Power," Asian Survey 29, no. 11 (November 1989):
1048-1049.
87
"If the eagle takes flight," The Economist . 4 August 1990,
25.
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may be similar enough to the rest of ASEAN so as to warrant a
generalization.
In Thailand, the Japanese policy of using ODA to create a
favorable infrastructural environment as a precursor to direct
foreign investment and commercial loans has proven successful.
"Japanese Ambassador to Bangkok, Hisahiko Okazaki estimates
that in the next three years, 300 Japanese factories will be
built in Thailand, partly on the back of a massive infusion of
official aid from Japan geared to long-term investment
projects." 88 Thai officials publicly laud Japan's investment
policies because Japanese aid has made Thailand habitable for
other investors and has helped fuel Thailand's export-based
economy. However, complaints abound. Many echo Hiroko Yamane
in saying that the Japanese are exploiting the currently
favorable conditions for industrial development without a
sense of regional responsibility. This is a problem that most
nations, who are able to extend their influence either by
military or economic means, fall into—the desire to transfer
one's goals and values to "clients" simply because one has the
"power" to do so; many time without due regard for the social,
religious, or ethnic considerations of the beneficiary state.
Critics of Thailand's relationship with Japan charge that
the government has mortgaged Thailand's future by relying too
88Rodney Tasker, "Wedded to Success," Far Eastern Economic
Review . 3 May 1990, 49.
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heavily on Japanese investment. There is concern that the
Thai economy has already become too dependent upon Japanese
investment, so much so that the Japanese may be in a position
to use their clout for political purposes. 89 In fact, some in
the government have already resigned themselves to a future of
dependence upon Japan. Recently, a Thai Foreign Ministry
official said, "Economically, we are dependent upon Japan. We
have to admit that. ... It would be next to impossible to
restructure our economic relationship." 90 This feeling is
pervasive in ASEAN and the impact is not lost on the Japanese.
If the military "commitment" of the United States to ASEAN is
scaled-back sharply, a power vacuum of sorts would be created.
This would inevitably affect the existing balance in the
trilateral U.S.-Japan-ASEAN relationship, particularly as
viewed from the Association. The 1990*3, then, could well be
a test of Japan's ability to promote continued peace and
prosperity in ASEAN through her particular brand of "dollar
diplomacy" without appearing to become too obtrusive. As
post-Cold War considerations have and will continue to impact
the national security decision-making process in the United
States and Japan, so too have they impacted the ASEAN states.
89,Tasker, "Wedded to Success," 50.
^aul Handley, "Unequal Partners," Far Eastern Economic
Review . 3 May 1990, 51.
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It seems that strategic planners and defense policy-makers
in ASEAN are willing to accept the demands that will be placed
on them as more of the burden of ensuring their own security
falls to them. Thus, they are accordingly building-up their
own indigenous defense capabilities. These two acts—the
reduction of a U.S. military presence concomitant with a
growth in local armed forces—might clear the way for latent
intraregional tensions to come to a boil. As well, a power
vacuum created by a rapid withdrawal or restructuring of the
U.S. military commitment to the region might invite unwanted
extraregional powers seeking to extend the range of their
armed forces. 91
These are some of the considerations which must be taken
into account as the future of ASEAN security and stability is
discussed. The gist of the problem is evident: in the post-
Cold War world, the potential threats to regional security are
many and varied, most of which are beyond the power of the
collective Association to control. Indeed, as economic and
political development proceed in these states, it is
questionable whether ASEAN itself will survive the resurgence
of national self-interest among its members.
91Richardson, "No Role for Japanese Military," 11.
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V. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN ASEAN STATES:
PROSPECTS FOR A COLLECTIVE SECURITY REGIME
The states that comprise the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations share many similar characteristics and concerns,
yet it is their differences which will more than likely
prevent ASEAN from becoming a cohesive security alliance.
Those who would argue against such a supposition might point
to ASEAN' s 23 year history and its progressive unity on many
economic issues. Others might claim that the Association
demonstrated remarkable solidarity as it sought to resolve the
Cambodian crisis. Of course, still others might recall that
a number of bilateral, trilateral, and even extraregional
security "relationships" already exist among these nations.
All of these are valid arguments which on the surface would
seem more than adequate to effectively rebut any assertion
that the factors against the formation of a wholly ASEAN-
centered security alliance outweigh those factors for such a
coalition. However, these positive arguments misrepresent
ASEAN as an entity of singular purpose and interest. As
previous chapters have indicated, there are many divisive
issues facing the Association members which challenge its
unity such as; uneven economic development, varying threat
perceptions, territorial disputes, and internal instability.
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A brief examination of some of the characteristics which
have influenced the cultural, political, economic, and
sociological development of the ASEAN states may help to show
that generally, they are more unique than similar. Geographic
setting, whether island or mainland, has been a significant
factor in developing these nations' outward orientations.
Cultural heritage, whether Sinic. Indie, Arabic, or even
Western, has influenced religious affiliations, ethnic makeup
and, in some of the ASEAN states, concerns among the ruling
elites over the ability of the "mother country" to exercise
excessive penetration into internal affairs. The varied
colonial histories of the ASEAN states, which have included
British, French, Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese, and American
control, not to mention the Japanese before, during, and since
World War II, have influenced indigenous political systems,
bureaucratic structure, and economic philosophy, as well as
military organization. While these are only a few examples of
how the memberstates of ASEAN have been, in a sense, molded
and made unique by their surroundings and their histories,
they are sufficient to illustrate the complexities within the
Association that make consensus-building so problematic.
Of course, consensus in ASEAN has been easier to achieve
in the face of a threat which is perceived to be "equally"
menacing to the national interests of all; ergo, of "group"
concern—for example the Vietnam-Cambodia issue. However,
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what is important to remember about the ASEAN position on the
Vietnam-Cambodia issue is that it was/ is grounded in politics
and diplomacy, not military force. That the tack taken by
ASEAN in response to Vietnamese aggression was political and
not military is due to two primary factors: l)the underlying
belief that the Vietnamese offensive would be restricted to
Indochina; and, 2) the belief that even if Vietnam had the
capability and decided to expand the scope of its invasion
beyond Indochina, the United States and/or China would act as
a buffer to prevent the hostile penetration of any of the
ASEAN states. 92 Essentially, the price of ASEAN unity in this
instance has been relatively cost-free to its membership. But
what of the future of ASEAN unity? As Zakaria Ahmad has
postulated, in lieu of the threat from Vietnam, is there
really a unifying concern in ASEAN in terms of security
considerations that is capable of overcoming and overriding
the self-interests of the individual memberstates? 93
Compounding the question of the future of ASEAN unity is
the impending drawdown of the U.S. military presence in the
%In the historical context of the Vietnamese incursion into
Cambodia, the issue of whether or not an ASEAN military response
would have been a viable policy alternative is moot. This is
because presumably their decision to take a political, rather than
military stand was based not as much on their inability to mount a
military response as it was on their perception that it was not
necessary, given the position of the United States in the region.
93Ahmad, "The Impending Challenge to ASEAN Regional
Cooperation , " 5
.
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region. The prospect of "going it alone" has led to changes
in the military orientations of most of the ASEAN states. The
ability to extend the scope of defense perimeters in support
of national interests has come to assume greater importance.
This development is significant in terms of ASEAN' s capacity
for military unity. As Zara Dian notes, "... in the security
field, the outstanding issue remains that of unilateralism
existing in a multilateral framework. ... in the future the
system [ASEAN] is *at risk' as there is no bind that
superimposes a regional blotter on national aspirations." 94
The remainder of this chapter will focus on the military
in ASEAN, particularly its relationship to the ruling elites,
its duties and responsibilities, current trends in arms
procurement, and intraregional and extraregional associations.
The following sections also examine the prospects for
consensus on defense issues and seeks to determine if there
exists in ASEAN the basis for a formal collective defense
organization.
A. INDEPENDENCE AND TURMOIL
Independence in Southeast Asia did not follow a uniform
timetable, and the processes through which it was achieved
have had a significant influence on the nature of the civil-
military relationship in each state. Thailand, the only ASEAN
^Dian, "The Return to ASEAN Solidarity," 3.
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state without a colonial heritage, gained re-independence
immediately following Japan's defeat. The Philippines were
"freed" from U.S. colonial administration on 4 July 1946. The
Indonesians fought a drawn-out battle for independence against
the Dutch which eventually ended in their favor in 1949.
Malaysia finally became an independent member of the British
Commonwealth only in 1957, and Singapore's independence would
not come until its secession from the Malay Federation in
1965. 95 Zakaria Ahmad has characterized those first two
decades of Southeast Asian history following the end of the
war "as the dramatic transformation of colonial entities as
independent states and the forging of x new' national
identities in a turbulent setting." 96
The competition for power between rival factions early on
made the consolidation of governmental authority and the
establishment of political legitimacy highly problematic.
Coups and coup attempts have been standard fare in Thailand
and the present leadership in Indonesia is the result of an
extremely bloody coup in 1965. Additionally, religious
separatist groups have been in action throughout the post-war
period in both Malaysia and the Philippines. Even today,
every ASEAN state has active insurgency groups except
95Defense & Foreign Affairs Handbook . 440-933.
^Zakaria Haji Ahmad, "Southeast Asia in the 1990s," Asian
Defence Journal (July 1990): 6.
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Singapore. 97 As well, extraregional actors—most notably
China—have acted in concert with communist insurgent groups
seeking to undermine the Western-oriented political systems in
these states. Presently, communist parties are outlawed in
all of the ASEAN states. 98
The threat to internal security posed by the influence of
extra-regional actors on the indigenous population has been a
constant in the post-independence period. China has been, of
course, the number one target of ASEAN recriminations
regarding its efforts to meddle in the internal affairs of the
Association's memberstates . In fact, a large part of this
problem relates to the issue of the so-called "overseas
Chinese"—those ethnic Chinese members of the respective ASEAN
populations without whom the rapid pace of economic
development in the last 25 years would have been difficult,
yet who are often looked upon with suspicion and regarded as
second-class citizens—with the exception of one Chinese-
dominated city-state, Singapore. 99 Significantly, the issue
of the "overseas Chinese" and China's support of revolutionary
movements in ASEAN only abated with the advent of the U.S.-
^Defense & Foreign Affairs Handbook . 440-933.
98Lau Teik Soon, "Political and Security Trends in the ASEAN
States," Asian Affairs 13, no. 3 (Fall 1986): 36.
"Tajima, China and South-east Asia . 16-26.
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China rapprochement of the 197 O's. 100 To be sure, problems
have persisted and the fears among Southeast Asians of latent
Chinese hegemonistic goals in the region remain very real
today
.
One of the results of the high level of internal political
turmoil in the ASEAN states is that all of "the nations in the
region share authoritarian, .. .political features." 101 Not
surprisingly, the military has had a significant role in the
internal security affairs of these states. As James Gregor
has pointed out:
Within Southeast Asia the strains attendant on
protracted war in Indochina and demanding economic
development elsewhere have created destabilizing
tensions. The dislocation of populations, the
erosion of familiar traditional patterns of
collective behavior, the precipitate rise in
expectations, the increase in population density,
and the maldistribution of welfare benefits have
all contributed to regional instability and the
real sense of protracted crisis. The result has
been regular recourse to special powers by the
noncommunist governments in the region. . . . Those
countries that have not opted for a Marxist
alternative have been compelled, by the very nature
of the complex and protracted crisis in which they
are involved, to employ authoritarian modalities to
control ethnic tensions, developmental
dislocations, political dissidence, and
revolutionary initiatives. 102
100Tajima, China and South-east Asia . 16-26.
101Gregor, In the Shadow of Giants . 6.
102Gregor, In the Shadow of Giants . 7.
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That the ASEAN states have, for the most part, gratefully
accepted the U.S. security umbrella as a guarantor of external
defense is largely due to their deep and abiding preoccupation
with internal security.
Gregor mentioned that the demands of economic development
have contributed to the generally inward-orientation of the
defense forces in ASEAN. Indeed, the concept of "defense for
development" is a fairly standard theme in ASEAN government
circles. Authoritarianism is warranted, so the theory goes,
because developing economies require internal stability if
they are to remain competitive. According to Tim Huxley, it
is "clear that development is unlikely to proceed smoothly if
a government lacks an effective military instrument with which
to secure its domain against external and internal threats . .
.
A country which is evidently unable to defend itself against
aggression is unlikely to appeal to either foreign or local
investors." 103 Echoing the "defense for development" theme,
General Chawalit, then Thailand's Deputy Prime Minister and
Defense Minister, noted that "building a stronger military
force should go hand-in-hand with economic and investment
development. Investment and other assets must be granted
security and protection. This means that the Thai Armed
forces must have the strength to protect the economy and
103Tim Huxley, "Internal Security, Defence and Development in
Southeast Asia," Arms Control 8, no. 2 (September 1987): 170.
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industry." 104 It is clear, then, that the indigenous armed
forces in ASEAN are expected to play a major role in
establishing the conditions under which export-oriented
economic development could flourish.
Of course, it is not unusual for the military to have a
significant role in the political affairs of developing
nations. This has certainly been the case in ASEAN, but
again, to underscore the differences between these nations,
the level of influence of and roles taken by the military in
the respective memberstates has in the past and continues
today to vary dramatically. According to Gregor, several
factors have contributed to justify the high level of military
participation and/or authoritarianism in the politics of the
ASEAN states. These factors include: "retarded industrial
development, high rates of population growth, ethnic tensions,
domestic insurgencies, and international insecurity." 105 By
extrapolation it can then be inferred that the functions of
the military 106 would include: supporting economic/ industrial
development; ensuring popular compliance with national
policies, including population guidelines; ameliorating ethnic
104FBIS-EAS-90-088, "Magazine Reports Plans to Upgrade Armed
Forces," 7 May 1990, 51-52.
105Gregor, In the Shadow of Giants , 6.
106For the purpose of this chapter, the rubric of military
forces includes constabulary forces, paramilitary security forces,
and national defense forces.
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tensions; combating domestic insurgencies; and, protecting the
state from the adverse effects of international insecurity.
Of course, the ability or desire of the military to meet its
assigned or chosen obligations depends heavily on a number of
factors such as available resources and threat perceptions.
In the ASEAN states the duties and responsibilities of the
military vary relative to each state's level of economic
development and civil stability. It appears that those states
with higher degrees of economic development have lower levels
of civic unrest and therefore, their military orientation is
moving outward, tending toward extended defense—for example,
Singapore. In those states with lower economic development,
we see higher levels of civic unrest and consequently a more
inward-oriented defense stance—for example, the Philippines.
These two examples are just the extremes on a continuum upon
which we would find the other ASEAN states.
In addition to assigned duties and responsibilities, other
factors such as the level and frequency of military
interrelationships with other nations, existing defense
dependencies, and patterns in arms production and procurement
can be indicative of whether or not a state is pursuing either
an internal or external defense posture. These "factors,"
duties and responsibilities, military interrelationships, and
patterns of arms procurement, will be addressed separately,
yet each is logically linked and, as a whole, define a states
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defense orientation. First, however, a brief discussion of
the position of the military relative to the governmental
decision making process is necessary; again, to illustrate the
differences between the individual ASEAN states.
B. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
Zakaria Haji Ahmad, in Military-Civilian Relations in
South-East Asia , identifies three archetypes of civil-military
relations in the region, two of which are applicable to ASEAN.
They are, " (1) non-communist countries in which the military
has intervened or is in authority, (2) non-communist countries
in which the military is subservient to the civilian
authorities in varying degrees, ... ,,lff7 He places Indonesia
and Thailand in the first category with Malaysia, Singapore,
the Philippines, and Brunei in the second. 108 Although these
groupings are acceptable for broad generalizations, they fail
to address, as Zakaria readily admits, the causes and effects
of these orientations and their impact on internal,
intraregional, and extraregional policy. To be sure, there
are similarities which warrant generalization, but there are
107Zakaria Haji Ahmad, "Configurative and Comparative Aspects
of Military-Civilian Relations," in Military-Civilian Relations in
South-East Asia , eds. Zakaria Haji Ahmad and Harold Crouch,
(Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985) , 5.
108Ahmad, "Configurative and Comparative," 6.
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also significant differences which require broader
analysis. 109
1. Thailand
Thailand is a nation with a strong martial heritage.
This has been particularly true since the coup which occurred
in June of 1932 where rule by princes was replaced by rule by
generals. 110 As a consequence of the leading role played by
the military in Thai politics, the nation has witnessed many
coups and coup attempts over the years. In fact, since 1936
there have been 15 coups and 13 constitutions. 111 As Zakaria
Ahmad has noted, these " [S]uccessful military interventions
usually resulted in the abrogation of constitutions, abolition
of parliaments, and suspension of participant political
activity." 112 The result of this chronic cycle of political
upheaval has been that participatory political institutions
are perceived as weak and have a low level of legitimacy. 113
"Changes of the government and political leadership are more
109Civil-Military relations in Brunei will not be explored in
depth due to lack of information and the very limited role of the
Brunei armed forces.
110Chai-Anan Samudavanija and Suchit Bunbongkarn, "Thailand,"
in Military-Civilian Relations in South-East Asia . 78.




often through coups than elections." 114 However, in February
1990, there was an indication that the military might be
willing to distance itself from direct participation in the
political process. According to Armed Forces Chief of Staff,
General Sunthon Khongsomphong,
In a few years, the presence of senators in
parliament will end. Military senators will
refrain from political involvement, concentrating
on national development. If they want to enter
politics they must resign and run for parliamentary
seats. It is necessary to educate people about
democracy so they will properly understand
politics. Soldiers will gradually withdraw
themselves; senior military officers have discussed
the issue and understand this. 115
Of course, the bloodless coup launched by the "National
Peacekeeping Council" (NPC) on 24 February 1991, overthrowing
the Chatichai government, demonstrates a continuing desire on
the part of the Armed Forces to be deeply involved in the
political affairs of state.
2. Indonesia
Quite distinct from the case in Thailand, the
Indonesian army cut its teeth and gained a measure of
legitimacy, in terms of its political role, in the battle for
independence fought against the Dutch immediately following
World War II. As a result, "the basic orientation of military
114Samudavanija, "Thailand," 79.
115FBIS-EAS-90-036, "Armed Forces Chief Predicts Military's
Future," 22 February 1990, 65.
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officers has been political from the very beginning. . . . they
were motivated by the desire to participate in the nationalist
struggle against colonialism." 116 The ineffectiveness of
Sukarno's "Guided-Democracy, " coupled with the Army's
perception that Sukarno was getting too close to local
communist groups, and failed economic policies, led to a coup
in 1965 since which time the Army, led by General Suharto, has
been firmly in control.
3. Malaysia
That the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) have not assumed
a greater direct role in the political affairs of state is a
tribute to the high degree of institutionalization and sense
of order inherited from the British. This is especially
significant in light of the fact that, like Indonesia, most of
Malaysia's problems are internal and the MAF, before and since
independence (in 1957) , has played a leading role in combating
insurgencies or quelling racial unrest— it appears that the
opportunity has been there for the MAF to expand the scope of
its role. And yet, " [T]hroughout the country's post-
independence travails and even before then, the role of the
armed forces has been clearly defined in terms of internal and
external defence missions and clearly subservient vis-a-vis
the civilian authorities.... This is clearly stated in the
116Harold Crouch, "Indonesia," in Military-Civilian Relations
in South-East Asia . 50.
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1957 and Malaysia (1963) Constitutions where the MAF is
described in Article 132 as a ^federal public service'." 117
Another significant factor that has contributed to maintaining
a stable relationship between the civilian government and the
MAF is the continued involvement of the British in Malaysian
defense since independence, first through the Anglo-Malayan
Defence Agreement (AMDA) , and later the Five-Power Defence
Agreement (FPDA). 118
4. Singapore
The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) were created after
Singapore seceded from Malaysia in 1965. 119 Several factors
have been responsible for maintaining the "undisputed
predominance of the civilian sector over the military." 120
First, the duties and responsibilities of the newly formed SAF
were dictated by Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's authoritarian, but
popular leader from before formal independence until just
recently—strong civilian control predated the formation of
the SAF. Second, the predominantly Chinese culture does not
value military institutions as highly as it does civilian.
117Zakaria Haji Ahmad, "Malaysia," in Military-Civilian
Relations in South-East Asia . 119-120.
118Ahmad, "Indonesia," 12 5-12 6.
119Chan Heng Chee, "Singapore," in Military-Civilian Relations
in South-East Asia . 136-139.
120Chee, "Singapore," 13 6.
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Third, the development of the officer corps stresses collegial
relations within its ranks; an unlikely setting from which a
military strongman might emerge. 121
5. Philippines
On the surface, the history of military-civilian
relations in the Philippines appears similar to that of
Malaysia. As part of their colonial legacy, a subordinate
role for the military to civilian authority was
institutionalized. Additionally, they both have ties to
extraregional powers who have, to varying degrees, served as
the military arm responsible for external defense. As a
result, the military, in this case the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) , has been able to concentrate on countering
internal threats, of which there have been no shortage.
The reality is that the institutional boundaries which
demarcated civilian-military roles began to be eroded after
1950, with the advent of the Economic Development Corps
(EDCOR) and other civic action programs of the AFP. 122 Thus
began a long period of civil-military relations that were
characterized by the increasing ability of the military to
exercise "influence" in political affairs. The advent of
martial law in 1972 under President Marcos saw military
121Chee, "Singapore," 137-154.
122Carolina G. Hernandez, "The Philippines," in Military-
Civilian Relations in South-East Asia . 190-191.
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"influence" give way to military "participation" in
politics. 123 "With respect to the permeation of military-
civilian institutional boundaries, since 1972 the role
expansion of the military has given the military a share in
the management of national development programmes and of
industries and business enterprises, a share in the
administration of justice, in addition to security, law and
order and civic action work." 124
It is the depth to which the military has involved
itself in political affairs that makes governing by Corazon
Aquino so problematic. Not only does she face real internal
threats such as the communist insurgency and the religious
separatists, but she must also face a faction-ridden, highly
politicized AFP whose loyalty is divided at best.
Though these brief portraits of civil-military
relations in the ASEAN states are by no means comprehensive,
they are sufficient to illustrate the differences in
orientation which would have to be overcome before a
collective security regime could be successfully launched.
However, beyond the basic problem of overcoming differences in
the orientation of the military to the politics of each nation
lie the difficulties inherent in: assimilating different
123Hernandez , "The Philippines," 191.
124Hernandez, "The Philippines," 191.
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defense philosophies, internal versus external orientations;
contrasting perceptions on the value of military
interrelationships, particularly with extraregional powers;
and, divergent threat perceptions which influence the
direction of arms purchases.
C. EVOLUTION OF DEFENSE ORIENTATIONS
The issue of "unilateralism existing in a multilateral
framework," especially with regards to security concerns, is
not a new phenomenon in ASEAN. There are more overt signs
that national self-interest is overcoming group interest in
its effect on security planning—such as Singapore's recent
offer to host a limited number of U.S. forces, a move
described by some of its ASEAN colleagues as overly self-
serving. However, the roots of this change predate the end of
the Cold War in Asia, the concomitant drawdown of U.S. forces
that will inevitably occur, and even the progress made on the
Cambodia issue. The key to the evolution of security concerns
in ASEAN has been the level or direction of economic
development experienced over the last twenty years which has
influenced defense budgets and military orientation. For the
most part, the manifestation of these evolving security
concerns has been a change from primarily a preoccupation with
internal security problems to a broader realization of
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external security threats and vulnerabilities. Sheldon Simon
notes several additional reasons for this change:
(1) the atrophy of communist insurgent groups in
the late 1970s following the split between China
and Vietnam and increased political and economic
stability within ASEAN societies (excepting the
Philippines) ; (2) concern in Singapore, Thailand,
and Malaysia particularly about the military
capabilities and intentions of Soviet-supplied
Vietnam after its invasion of Cambodia; and (3) the
realization that to defend and exploit 200-mile
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) is [sic] air and
maritime surveillance required. 1"
Of course, internal unrest is not isolated only to the
Philippines and the fears engendered by Vietnam's invasion of
Cambodia in 1978 are no longer as great as they once were.
What rationale is there that can explain the continuation of
authoritarianism or direct military rule in ASEAN? In
Indonesia for example, a central rationale used by the army to
justify its dominance of the political scene is its claim that
it serves a "dual function," i.e., it has both an economic and
a civil role. The Armed Forces in Thailand share a similar
orientation.
The idea that the military can serve "dual functions" is
not unique to Indonesia and Thailand. In ASEAN the
distinction between national defense forces and constabulary
or paramilitary forces is often blurred. In reality a
continuum exists in ASEAN where the defense orientations of
125Simon, "ASEAN Security in the 1990' s," 584.
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the military forces range from almost completely external to
almost completely internal. On one extreme, Singapore, the
most advanced of the ASEAN economies, adheres to the "poisoned
shrimp" philosophy; the idea that it will make itself so
strong militarily that any attack on it would be unpalatable
to the would-be aggressor. Although, M. Shuhud Saaid has
noted that "it is hardly a defence-oriented fighting force,
its war fighting war-winning doctrine being that of the
preemptive strike, and its strategy being to defend the
country as far forward as possible." 126 On the other extreme,
in the Philippines the AFP are as much policemen as soldiers.
It is "[T]he only ASEAN state whose military remains devoted
exclusively to counterinsurgency ..." 127 The level of civil
unrest in the Philippines is so high that both soldiers and
policemen drill together in "anti-tank warfare and street
battle techniques ... in preparation for possible coup
attempts by rightest forces." 128 Further, defense officials
talk of "the need to update the integrated defense plans of
cities and municipalities in order to further check rebel
attacks on town halls, police stations, and military
126M. Shuhud Saaid, "The Singapore Army," Asian Defence Journal
(June 1987) : 18.
127Simon, "ASEAN Security in the 1990' s," 585.
128FBIS-EAS-90-006, "Further Report," 9 January 1990, 55.
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detachments." 129 The defense orientations of the other ASEAN
states fall on this continuum between these extremes. The
distinctive feature of this continuum in ASEAN is that there
appears to be a correlation between the magnitude of the
internal security problem, the level of economic development,
and the orientation of the military forces. It is chiefly the
orientation of the defense forces in these states that
dictates the pattern of military modernization.
D. ARMS PROCUREMENT
Perhaps the most obvious indication that the ASEAN states
are, for the most part, expanding their defense horizons is in
the pattern of arms procurement and production witnessed in
the last decade. As Sheldon Simon notes, " [B]y the late
1980s, ASEAN governments had acquired respectable regional
power projection forces, and several states were also
upgrading their air and naval inventories in anticipation of
maritime defense needs in the 1990s." 130 Here again, though
the concept of "defence for development" is generally accepted
among the ASEAN states as a rationale for expanding defense
budgets, there are certainly other considerations which may or
may not be unique to the individual states. The particular
129FBIS-EAS-90-082, "Improved Defense Measures Sought at
Meeting," 27 April 1990, 37.
130Simon, "ASEAN Security in the 1990' s," 584.
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development requirements of a state and its own peculiar
threat perceptions also have a hand in determining the path
that military modernization may take.
In Malaysia, the force modernization, which includes the
acquisition of advanced fighter aircraft, two submarines,
artillery, SAM's, and air defense radars is "motivated by
concerns over the Soviet naval buildup at Cam Ranh Bay,
concern over Vietnam's intentions in the South China Sea, and
China's growing blue water capability—all in the vicinity of
Kuala Lumpur's offshore oil and gas production wells near the
disputed Spratly Islands." 131 Thailand has acquired U.S. F-
16 's that could be used to hit Vietnamese targets and "has
also made arrangements for a $100 million joint weapons
stockpile with the United States." 132 It appears then, that
Vietnam's departure from Cambodia has done little to diminish
Thailand's concern with potential threats emanating from
beyond its borders. As well, Singapore has made significant
investments in upgrading its military forces, particularly its
maritime surveillance and air interceptor capabilities. 133
Overall, defense expenditures in the ASEAN states have
131Simon, "ASEAN Security in the 1990 's," 584.
132Simon, "ASEAN Security in the 1990' s," 585, Thailand has also
entered into a weapons stockpiling agreement with China.
133FBIS-EAS-90-046, "Armed Forces To Buy Maritime Patrol
Aircraft," 8 March 1990, 37.
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increased dramatically in the last ten years. According to
SIPRI statistics, defense budgets in the ASEAN states from
1980 to 1989 have risen as follows: Brunei up 39%; Indonesia
up 98%; Malaysia up 37%; the Philippines up 182%; Singapore up
132%; and Thailand up 65%. 134
The effects of the force modernization have not been
without impact within the Association—a testimony to the
problems of "unilateralism existing in a multilateral
framework." Huxley claims that one of the most important
factors behind the rush to increase defense capabilities is
intra-ASEAN competition. 135 Suchit Bunbongkarn of Bangkok's
Chulalonkorn University has called this "a kind of prestige-
driven arms race." 136 A case in point is the delivery of F-
16' s to Thailand which ended a mad scramble to determine who
among the ASEAN states would be the first to receive the
planes—Singapore and Indonesia have since received their
orders. 137 In the Philippines, Foreign Affairs Secretary
Manglapus has urged his government to keep pace with the
134SIPRI Yearbook 1990: World Armaments and Disarmament ,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 188. The dramatic growth
of the Philippine defense budget reflects increased civil unrest
and higher rents paid by the U.S. for Subic and Clark et al.
135Huxley, "Internal Security," 182.
13
*FBIS-EAS-90-033, "Article Analyzes Military's Political
Role," 16 February 1990, 80.
137M Shuhud Saaid, "RTAF F-16s A Southeast Asian First," Asian
Defence Journal (August 1988): 35-38.
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defense improvements undertaken by the other Association
members, most notably Malaysia. "We should take our own steps
to make sure that any build-up on the part of neighboring
countries does not result in any uneven situation." 138
Similarly, Indonesia has expressed concern over Thailand's
agreement with China on arms stockpiling, fearing that those
weapons could be used by the Khmer Rouge to perpetuate the
internal crisis in Cambodia. 139 Though these are just two
examples, they underscore the fact that there is not a unified
defense philosophy within ASEAN that has been able to override
national self-interest. Nevertheless, there are areas where
defense cooperation exists.
E. MILITARY INTERRELATIONSHIPS
ASEAN itself is not a military organization nor was it
ever intended to become one. However, this does not mean that
military and security cooperation have been absent from the
realm of intra-Association relations. Indeed, since "the
collapse of Saigon in 1975, the states of ASEAN have engaged
in security and military cooperation, with the latter
primarily on a bilateral basis and the former on the basis of
concerted regional action in the political and diplomatic
138FBIS-EAS-90-087, "Manglapus Urges Keeping Pace," 4 May 1990,
27.
139Simon, "ASEAN Security in the 1990' s," 585.
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arenas." 140 Security cooperation, which need not have a
military component, has been most visibly represented in ASEAN
by the generally unified and consistent political stance taken
by the memberstates on the Cambodia issue. Military
cooperation has been far less unified; although, the number of
bilateral military exercises within ASEAN has increased over
the last decade. Exercises between Malaysia and Indonesia,
Singapore and Brunei, Thailand and Indonesia, and Thailand and
Malaysia are among those that have been characterized by
increasing frequency and level of forces participating. 141
There has been as well, a move toward sharing training
facilities and even allowing smaller partners to operate their
own installations in other states. For instance, Singapore
has training sites in Brunei, Indonesia, Thailand, and the
Philippines. 142
However, "the bilateral arrangements that have emerged are
non-comprehensive in terms of the potential pairings,..." 143
the Philippines being notably absent. There is also concern
140Ahmad, "Future Patterns of ASEAN Regional Security
Cooperation," 30.
141Simon, "ASEAN Security in the 1990' s," 586.
142Simon, "ASEAN Security in the 1990' s," 584.
143Ahmad, "Future Patterns of ASEAN Regional Security
Cooperation," 32, citing D. Weatherbee, "Obstacles and
Possibilities in ASEAN Defence Cooperation: The Strategic
Imperatives," Paper Read at the ADJ Forum, 3.
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among the more outward-oriented members regarding the
reliability of a "greater ASEAN" military cooperative.
Indeed, in Singapore, Second Defense Minister (Service) , Lee
Hsien Loong, indicated that defense relations were tied to
overall relations. "If the overall relations were good,
defense ties would naturally prosper. ... if problems cropped
up,... relations would be similarly affected." 144 Thus,
"cooperation is not likely to go beyond bilateral exercises as
x the fear is that when partners fall out, it will leave a
complete gap in maintenance, and therefore war-fighting
capability, in any intra-ASEAN dispute.'" 145
This is precisely why military ties to extraregional
powers exist, such as Malaysia and Singapore (with the likely
addition of Brunei) linked with Great Britain, Australia, and
New Zealand under the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA) , and
of Thailand and the Philippines linked with the United States
under the Manila Pact. In fact, given the emergence of some
of the most modern weapons systems in the Western inventory in
ASEAN military forces—the F-16's and the E-2's in particular-
-links with advanced, extraregional powers probably provide
better training opportunities than would exercises involving
144FBIS-EAS-90-052, "Bilateral, Defense Ties with Neighbors
Viewed," 16 March 1990, 30.
145Ahmad, "Future Patterns of ASEAN Regional Security
Cooperation," 32, citing J. N. Mak, "ASEAN Air Cooperation: An
Appraisal," paper read at the ADJ Forum.
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only ASEAN forces. Also, as Zakaria Ahmad rightly points out,
the deterrent value of exercises with and formal military ties
to major extraregional powers far exceeds that of any
bilateral or multilateral ASEAN relationship. 146
In the final analysis, military relationships involving
ASEAN members, whether they be bilateral commitments within
the Association or alliances with an extraregional power, are
entered into to serve national interests or to counter
particular threats. If two or more of the Association members
have like concerns, sympathetic needs, or shared threat
perceptions that can be resolved through military cooperation,
then a bilateral or trilateral arrangement within the
framework of ASEAN might be realized. If, however, national
security interests cannot be met by entering into a bilateral
defense arrangement with another memberstate, then a
partnership with an extraregional actor will be sought.
The fact that there are agreements such as the FPDA and
the Manila Pact that still serve as the basis for continued
extraregional military presence in Southeast Asia suggest that
there are defense and security issues in the region that
cannot be met through strictly intra-ASEAN cooperation.
Political obstacles such as boundary disputes, competing
territorial claims over EEZ's, and lack of consensus on a
146Ahmad, "Future Patterns of ASEAN Regional Security
Cooperation," 32.
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common enemy outside of Vietnam will continue to serve as
roadblocks to greater ASEAN military integration, and increase
the likelihood that extraregional military relationships will
need to remain an aspect of the overall Southeast Asian
defense picture.
As a product of different histories, cultures, and socio-
political-economic development patterns, ASEAN is not a
homogeneous organization. In its early stages, when all of
the members were experiencing economic and political growing
pains, ASEAN was often able to forge consensus on issues
because of a shared sense of weakness. However, due to
variances in the pace of economic growth, and different levels
of success in combating internal unrest, the interest and goal
horizons of the members began to diverge; some expanding and
some contracting. This process has effected changes in threat
perceptions and military orientations; further adding to the
heterogeneity of the Association, and limiting prospects for
consensus.
For the future, "national political considerations will
dictate whether military or security cooperation will take
place..." 147 within ASEAN. By implication, it must then be
acknowledged that military cooperation will be a derivative of
shared interests and common concerns. If this premise is to
147Ahmad, "Future Patterns of ASEAN Regional Security
Cooperation , " 30.
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be the basis for significant military cooperation in ASEAN,
then inevitably the future of such cooperation within the
Association will be highly fragmented.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Soviet retrenchment, the "liberation" of Eastern Europe,
and the CSCE agreement are all indications that the Cold War
is over. In Asia, Moscow's willingness to sever aid flows to
Vietnam and its political and economic overtures to South
Korea and Japan provide further evidence that the Soviet Union
is no longer willing or able to isolate itself politically and
economically from the "democratic" industrialized nations it
has opposed over the last 45 years. Certainly, a little back
slapping among Western leaders would seem justified,
particularly in the United States where the burden of anti-
communist rhetoric and action had assumed the guise of a moral
obligation. Clearly, our strategy has been vindicated. Some
might think that the United States has earned the right to
pull itself out of the game and direct its attentions to its
pressing domestic problems. Others, particularly President
Bush, think the time is right to press America's advantage
vis-a-vis our old foe (new friend?) and resolve the remaining
issues which stand between us and the New World Order (NWO)
.
Can we do both?
The United States has emerged from the rigors of the Cold
War struggle as the most powerful actor, both militarily and
economically, in the community of nations; it is unarguably
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the only true superpower in the world today. However, United
States policy-makers must quickly move beyond the static
assumptions that underlaid national strategy planning during
the Cold War era. No prudent security strategist should
content himself solely with the empirical evidence of national
strengths and capabilities, foregoing a deeper examination of
equally important needs, interests, and weaknesses that must
be factored into the national strategy equation.
Additionally, in a period of radical and rapid change within
the international community, any strategy based on the old
maxim, "if it ain't broke, don't fix it," will surely lead to
misuse of national resources, misguided foreign policy
initiatives, and inevitably, missed opportunities for
advancing the national agenda. This is not, however, an
argument for wholesale changes. Rather, it is merely a
recommendation that the United States recognize that the
opportunities presented to the nation by the dramatic changes
that have occurred over the last few years afford us a measure
of flexibility which has heretofore been absent in developing
the national agenda.
The problem, of course, is articulating just exactly what
constitutes the national agenda and determining how it fits in
the New World Order. Fortunately for U.S. strategists, the
international community of nations is still in a state of flux
following the shockingly abrupt ending of the Cold War and the
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NWO is an evolving rubric under which the U.S. would like to
place the era following that of the Cold War. The implication
is that U.S. policymakers are now presented with many options
as they attempt to outline the goals and objectives of our
post-Cold War national strategy. Thus, given the preeminent
position of the United States today, the decisions made by its
strategists will, in effect, define the NWO and substantially
influence the direction of interstate relations well into the
21st Century. However, a critical preface to policy decisions
that will be made to give form and substance to the NWO must
be acceptance of the relative decline of U.S. power across the
entire spectrum of interstate relations vis-a-vis our friends
and allies. Unlike the Cold War era, it will not be possible,
nor should it be desirable, for the United States to establish
unilateral dominion over the political, economic, and military
agendas of the international community. Certainly though,
given the breadth and depth of U.S. capabilities across the
board, it is in a unique position to exercise a significant
leadership role in giving international legitimacy to the
substance of the NWO.
An important question American strategists must ask as the
U.S. prepares to define the NWO is what role should the United
States seek to play in that Order? What obligations and
responsibilities is the U.S. willing and able to accept?
Perhaps equally important is the issue of how the U.S. will
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manage the transition period it is now entering—what actions
must America take to ensure its long-term goals are achieved?
Should the U.S. be content, during the transition period and
into the future, to be willing to act militarily as the first
option in defense of the political-economic ideals it hopes
will undergird the NWO? The current situation in the Middle
East would seem to indicate, for the moment at least, that the
United States may be one of only a few nations capable of
doing so. Should America push to internationalize the burden
of defense of our (the world's?) ideals? The success
President Bush had in putting together the multinational
coalition in the war against Iraq seems to indicate that some
of these ideals are shared by others willing to accept the
sacrifice that necessarily accompanies such action, be it in
the political, economic, or military realm. Or, should the
United States take the opportunity given by the "collapse" of
the Soviet threat to limit the scope of its global security
concerns and focus its attentions along more narrowly defined
national interests? Failure to choose the proper path in a
given circumstance might well help to precipitate an
irreversible decline of U.S. political, economic, and military
strength. As Paul Kennedy warns:
Although the United States is at present still
in a class of its own economically and perhaps even
militarily, it cannot avoid confronting the two
great tests which challenge the longevity of every
major power that occupies the "number one" position
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in world affairs: whether, in the
military/strategic realm, it can preserve a
reasonable balance between the nation's perceived
defense requirements and the means it possesses to
maintain those commitments; and whether, as an
intimately related point, it can preserve the
technological and economic bases of its power from
relative erosion in the face of ever-shifting
patterns of global production. This test of
American abilities will be the greater because it,
like Imperial Spain around 1600 or the British
Empire around 1900, is the inheritor of a vast
array of strategical commitments which had been
made decades earlier, when the nation's political,
economic, and military capacity to influence world
affairs seemed so much more assured. In
consequence, the United States now runs the risk,
so familiar to historians of the rise and fall of
previous Great Powers, of what might roughly be
called "imperial overstretch": that is to say,
decision-makers in Washington must face the awkward
and enduring fact that the sum total of the United
States' global interests and obligations is
nowadays far larger than the country's power to
defend them all simultaneously. 148
Of course, an examination of the "United States' global
interests and obligations" is well beyond the scope of this
thesis. Therefore, attention has been directed to analyzing
some of the elements that have influenced the peculiar and
somewhat paradoxical United States-ASEAN security
relationship. The peculiar nature of this relationship stems
from the rather disparate views of the Association's members
regarding extraregional security ties. As has been shown,
there is uneven support for the idea that the Association
should strive to create in their region a Zone of Peace,
,48Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New
York: Random House, 1987), 514-515.
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Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) . In lieu of the attainment of
this objective, virtually all of the ASEAN states have
recognized the advantage of having a tacit security
arrangement with a benign extraregional actor
—
principally the
United States. Yet there appears to be an inconsistent, overt
willingness among the memberstates, save the recent
Singaporean offer, to provide the facilities necessary for a
long-term relationship based primarily on security
considerations. Indeed, in the Philippines, the issue of base
access for U.S. forces appears to be strictly a monetary
concern.
As this thesis has illustrated, from the U.S. perspective,
its role in the framework of ASEAN security developed more as
a by-product of the U.S. presence in the region rather than an
objective of its presence. Granted, the United States does
have formal security ties with Thailand and the Philippines
but they are grounded in strategic assumptions that no longer
appear to be militarily viable considerations.
Essentially, Southeast Asia's strategic position at the
nexus of our Northeast Asian and Southwest Asian interests
has, by default, provided it security coverage under America's
forward deployed military strategy. That is not to say that
the United States has not actively pursued policies aimed at
enhancing the security of ASEAN, it is merely an
acknowledgement that any such initiatives were more than
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likely derivative of greater interests elsewhere. 149 Of
course, the U.S. view of ASEAN security has evolved to the
point where the Association is now considered, according to
Secretary Solomon, "one of the pillars of U.S. relations with
the Pacific ..."
The paradox of the relationship is that, on the one hand,
the United States provides to the ASEAN states something they
need and want—namely security from hostile extraregional
intrusion and the freedom to focus national resources on
internal development. On the other hand, the United States
also stands as the most visible representation of what some
ASEAN states, particularly Indonesia, would ostensibly prefer
to see end—armed extraregional activity within the confines
of the ZOPFAN. Likewise, to the United States, ASEAN
represents—for the most part—the type of political and
economic success that it has sought to promote and nurture
over the last 4 5 years. And yet today, the United States is
finding it increasingly difficult to accept the economic
challenge presented by the dramatic growth of these nations.
However, as the U.S. attempts to redefine its role in the
region, it must be mindful of the precedent it has set in
establishing the baseline from which ASEAN* s security has
evolved. As this thesis has attempted to show, the U.S.
149LaFeber, The American Age . 52 0.
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military presence and Japanese economic participation are
indivisible elements of the Southeast Asian security picture.
Any proposed change in the role of the United States in the
region must accommodate this fact. According to Paul
Wolfowitz, the U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy,
H [T]he bottom line is that while we can adjust our force
levels and we plan to do so, we must maintain a credible
presence in this region if we wish to remain a world power, to
protect our national interest, and to preserve a secure
environment in which democracy and free economies can
prosper. " 15°
The role that the United States has had in the
orchestration of ASEAN security has been a relatively easy
part to play largely because U.S. strategists have not had to
tailor the performance to fit the scene. To use a metaphor,
for the past 45 years, the world has been America's stage and
the spotlight has been on the U.S. as it took the lead in
trying to contain the spread of "Soviet-sponsored" communism.
Wherever there was a challenge from the Soviets or their
surrogates, U.S. strategists dusted off a proven script and
went into action. To be sure, there were subtle variations,
some ad-libbing here and there, but for the most part, seldom
was there deviation from the general text. Of course, that
150Susumu Awanohara, "Flurry of Signals," Far Eastern Economic
Review . 3 May 1990, 10.
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worked well when America had a clearly recognizable foe.
Today, however, it would appear that most of our preconceived
notions regarding "the threat" and security have been overcome
by events. Not surprisingly, then, U.S. leadership is having
a difficult time adjusting to the New World Order and defining
the role that the United States will play in that order. This
is especially problematic in the United States because it is,
arguably, the only nation with truly "global" interests—
a
consideration that has helped to rationalize and justify its
efforts to assume global responsibilities. The major hurdle
faced by the United States, particularly in terms of security
strategy, will be to break down its "global" mentality, which
has tended to dictate its responses to all security issues,
into its component parts—regionalize the United States'
future security strategies based on bottom-line assessments of
its interests and threats to them, while taking into
consideration the needs and expectations of potential security
partners. Toward that end, Southeast Asia and the future
security of ASEAN presents some unique problems.
Traditionally, the United States has viewed the security
of ASEAN as dependent upon two things: (1) continued economic
growth and viability; and (2) stable internal environments.
In regard to the former, U.S. policies in support of the
economic development of ASEAN, with the concomitant
contributions of the Japanese, have been hugely successful
—
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the Philippines being the notable exception. As to the
latter, the over arching U.S. presence in the region
throughout much of the post-World War II period has allowed
the ASEAN states to direct their own security and defense
forces inward to help put down insurrections or separatist
movements thereby enhancing internal security/51 a necessary
precondition to economic development. Today, with the same
notable exception, the ASEAN states are enjoying relatively
stable internal environments and generally successful
economies. Overall, then, U.S. policy regarding security and
stability in the region has been successful—from the
perspective of the United States. However, a key issue for
the future is whether or not the factors for instability have
been eradicated by U.S. policy or just deferred. In some
circles within ASEAN, Indonesia in particular, the end of the
Cold War means "that this perception that a threat from the
north exists should be removed because Japan, Vietnam, and
probably China, in reality, could not easily attack ... Hl52
In others, such as Singapore, there is "anxiety that
withdrawal of the superpowers from South-East Asia could
prompt Asian nations with strong forces
—
particularly Japan,
151Singh, "The United States in Southeast Asia," 54.
152FBIS-EAS-90-055, "Perception of Threat from North said
^Outdated'," 21 March 1990, 30.
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China and India—to take their place." 153 Such division over
the nature of the threat may be symptomatic of deeper rifts
within the Association. The American policy of containment
—
the exclusion or buffering of potentially disruptive
extraregional influences—may have neglected to address the
intraregional disputes; issues which may pose a far greater
obstacle to lasting regional peace and stability than
extraregional threats.
With the impending military decline of the U.S. in the
region, the inclination to "paper over" disputes may wane as
group interests are overcome by national self-interest. As
Wong Kan Seng, Singapore's Foreign Minister noted, conflict in
Southeast Asia has traditionally been rooted in indigenous
frictions. 154 As a consequence of these developments we see,
particularly in the more advanced economies, but not isolated
strictly to them, arms purchases and defense postures that are
becoming increasingly oriented toward their external
environment. 155 What does this trend toward external defense
orientations in ASEAN mean to the United States? Does the
increasing ability of the majority of the ASEAN states to
project their defense resources in support of their national
153Richardson, "No Role for the Japanese Military," 11.
154Richardson, "Breaking down the Asian barriers," 24.
155Simon, "ASEAN Security in the 1990' s," 585.
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interests obviate the need for a U.S. military presence in the
region? It would appear not, particularly since there is
strong resistance within the Association to the formation of
a formal collective security organization. 156
If the events of the last two years—Vietnam's withdrawal
from Cambodia, the crumbling of the Soviet empire, Soviet
overtures to Korea and Japan, and the suspension of Soviet aid
to Vietnam—are defined as the end of the Cold War in Asia,
then the justification for a large-scale U.S. military
presence in the region has become anachronistic. However, the
U.S. must also be cognizant of the vulnerabilities of the
ASEAN states to potentially disruptive internal,
intraregional, and extraregional influences. Given ASEAN'
s
poor track record of military cooperation within the
Association 157
,
a strong case could be made that in lieu of a
unifying threat, e.g., Vietnam, the memberstates might find it
increasingly in their best interest to "go it alone" and cut
deals with potential adversaries. In terms of security,
"Association politics" might very well give way to the
unilateralist approach. Nevertheless, as long as the United
States has national interests stretching from Southwest Asia
156Michael Vatikiotis, "Time to rethink," Far Eastern Economic
Review . 21 March 1991, 19.
157Ahmad, "Future Patterns of ASEAN Regional Security
Cooperation," 28.
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to Northwest Asia, it will have a vested interest in
preventing the potentially destabilizing disintegration of
ASEAN—using whatever means are available and suitable for
meeting the minimum requirements for regional stability and
access. Yet, a U.S. military security blanket should not be
available for the region's actors to use as a cover for not
addressing the existing, but suppressed, divisive issues among
them. For the future then, the United States should shed its
"defense pact" mentality and support a greater Pacific
security forum along the lines of the CSCE. Naysayers might
claim that similar proposals have, in the past, died on the
vine because of the region's size, and diversity
—
politically,
economically, and culturally. Certainly, these are not
insignificant challenges to the successful fruition of such a
grandiose scheme. However, a "New World Order" implies
radical change from assumptions previously held regarding the
nature and method of interstate relations. To be sure,
achieving a "New World Order" will not be a panacea which will
resolve all international problems. What it might give the
United States, though, is the opportunity to address its
national needs unburdened by the constraints attendant in
marshalling its resources to meet a "global" contingency.
98
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